

Polish Journal of Political Science



Volume 3 Issue 2 (2017)

(this page is intentionally left blank)

Polish Journal of Political Science

Volume 3 Issue 2

Editorial Board

Clifford Angell Bates Jr., University of Warsaw

Stephen Brooks, University of Michigan

Michael Freedon, University of Nottingham, University of Oxford

Shpresa Kureta, Her Excellency Ambassador of Albania to Poland

Paolo Pombeni, University of Bologna

Bohdan Szlachta, Jagiellonian University in Krakow

Tomasz Żyro, University of Warsaw

Editors:

Jarosław Szczepański

Karolina Kochańczyk-Bonińska

Associate Editors

Przemysław Biskup

Aneta Marcinkowska (Statistics)

Stanisław Matsumoto

Iwona Miedzińska

Krystian Pałyska

Maciej Sadowski

Łukasz Smalec

Marta de Zuniga

eISSN 2391-3991

Original version: e-book

Visit our site: www.pjps.pl

Submit your paper: pjps@inop.edu.pl

(this page is intentionally left blank)

Table of Contents

Articles

Monika Ożóg

*The Medallion of Theoderic the Great as a Tool of Political
Propagandap. 6*

Jarosław Szczepański

Demeny Voting in Poland: Introduction to a Research Concept.....p. 25

Marcin Olechowski

The mechanism and instruments of psychological warfare p. 38

Monika Ozóg

University of Wrocław

The Medallion of Theoderic the Great as a Tool of Political Propaganda¹

Abstract

At the turn of the 5th and 6th centuries, the civilitas forming in Italy was ruled by one of the powerful figures of Late Antiquity (or the Early Middle Ages): Theoderic the Great, King of the Ostrogoths, later also King of Italy. Raised in Constantinople,² he was aware of the power conveyed by imagery and of the significant role of monetary policy. The present article is focused on the preserved medallion of Theoderic and aims to discuss the question of how the image of this ruler affected his position and whether it could have been a political propaganda tool.

Key words: *Theoderic the Great, medallion of Senigalla, multiplum, Ostrogoths*

¹ I would hereby like to thank Deutsch-Polnische Wissenschaftsstiftung as well as Julius – Maximilians-Universität Würzburg for the research grant which made it possible for me to further study the topic and to collect the necessary literature for the preparation this article.

² Cf. A. Garzya, *Teodorico a Bisanzio*, “Sileno” 20 (1994), 241-251.

The imperial portrait served as a symbol identified with the source of authority. As Paul Zanker puts it: "The power of images was realized in their reciprocal influence. The rulers would also succumb to the suggestion of the symbol they used."³ Representations have served the various functions relating to information policy, education, and propaganda, being the peculiar visual language, the language of communication. It must be said, nonetheless, that coinage is a one-way source, conveying the message imposed by the issuer, who remains the sole authority responsible for the entire content of the monetary propaganda.

At the turn of the 5th and 6th centuries, the *civilitas* forming in Italy was ruled by one of the powerful figures of Late Antiquity (or the Early Middle Ages): Theoderic the Great, King of the Ostrogoths, later also King of Italy. Raised in Constantinople,⁴ he was aware of the power conveyed by imagery and of the significant role of monetary policy. The present article is focused on the preserved medallion of Theoderic and aims to discuss the question of how the image of this ruler affected his position and whether it could have been a political propaganda tool.

As far as the so-called barbarian rulers are concerned, the only known examples of images in gold, apart from Theoderic's medallion, are those of Hilderic (a signet) and Alaric II (a ring). These pieces are unique specimens (not reproduced in any other attested copy), possibly owned by the portrayed

³ P. Zanker, *Augustus und die Macht der Bilder*, München 1997, 12.

⁴ Cf. A. Garzya, *Teodorico a Bisanzio*, "Sileno" 20 (1994), 241-251.

rulers themselves.⁵ When in the mid-6th century, Theodebert I of Austrasia (534-548) decided to strike the gold coin depicting his image, a move intended to express his opposition to the East, the authorities of the Byzantine Empire did not conceal their indignation. It was commonly perceived as an act of abuse. Even Procopius, in his *De bello gothico*, stated with revulsion:

It would be impossible for a barbarian king to have his portrait struck on a coin of gold, even if he should have plenty of gold, for he would not obtain approval to use it even among the barbarians...⁶

The triple solidus medallion bearing an image of Theoderic the Great, the Ostrogothic King of Italy in the years 493-526, was found in the tomb complex at Senigalla (known as Sena Gallica in Antiquity, in the present-day province of Ancona)⁷ in December 1894. The piece is now in the collection of Museo Nazionale Romano. The term “Roman gold medallion” is used to refer to the issues whose weights would exceed the weight of the basic denomination in circulation (relative to the Roman pound). Never used in general circulation, they were objects of special purpose, often presented

⁵ Cf. A. Bursche, *Złote medaliony rzymskie w Barbaricum. Symbolika prestiżu i władzy społeczeństw barbarzyńskich u schyłku starożytności*, Warszawa: UW 1998, 220.

⁶ Prokopios Kaisareus, *De bello Gothico* III, 33, Procopii Caesariensis *Opera Omnia*, recognovit Jacobus Haury, vol. I, *De bellis libri I-IV*, editio stereotypa correctior addenda et corrigenda adiecit Gerhard Wirth, Lipsiae 1963, 442-443.

⁷ Cf. F. Gnechi, *Medaglione d'oro di Teoderico*, “Rivista Italiana di Numismatica” 8 (1895), 149-165; A. von Sallet, *Münzen und Medaillen* (Handbücher der Königl. Museen zu Berlin), Berlin 1898, 101; P. Grierson, *Una moneta d'argento inedita di Teodorico il Grande*, “Numismatica” 1 (1960), 113-115; P. Grierson, *The Date of the Gold Medallion of Theoderic the Great*, “Hikui” 11 (1984), 19-26.

as emperor's gift. Specimens of greater weight were fitted with attached gold rings or clasps.⁸

The *multiplum*⁹ under consideration is a gold medallion, 33 mm in diameter and 15.32 g in weight (i.e., about three solidi). It was struck in Italy, at Rome or Ravenna, although judging from the reverse inscription COMOB, the mint of Rome is a more likely option.¹⁰ There are attested cases where provincial mints would have used the same mint mark as Rome. Also, abbreviated forms of the legend referring to the mint location do not have to be identical (e.g., for the Rome mint: R, ROM, ROMA). In the case of coins struck in precious metal, the abbreviation COMOB was used, meaning: COM(ES) OB(RYZIACI) or OB(RYZAE). This official was responsible for the purity of gold in the solidus (*comes sacrarum largitionum*). Frequently, the title of the comes (*obryza*) was featured alongside the location of the issue. In the 4th-5th centuries, the solidi bearing the inscription COM were minted at Mediolanum (Milan), while the tremisses from Thessalonica would have COMOB.¹¹ As a rule, the lower part of the solidus' reverse (so-called *exargium*)

⁸ Cf. P. Bastien, *Les multiples d'or, de l'avènement de Dioclétien à la mort de Constantin. Essai de classement métrologique*, "Revue Numismatique" 6 (1972) no. 14, 49-82; C. L. Clay, *Roman imperial medallions: the date and purpose of their issue*, [in:] *Actes du VIII^e Congrès international de numismatique*, ed. H. A. Cahn, G. L. Rider, Paris 1976, 253-265.

⁹ The term *multiplum* refers to the multiple reproduction (also partial) of the units minted.

¹⁰ Cf. W. W. Wroth, *Catalogue of the coins of the Vandals, Ostrogoths and Lombards: and of the empires of Thessalonica, Nicaea and Trebizond in the British Museum*, London 1911, 54; E. Bernareggi, *Il medaglione d'oro di Teoderico*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 71 (1969), 96. However, as the above note points out, the minting mark cannot be taken as an indication of the coin's provenance.

¹¹ Cf. G. Depeyrot, *Le trésore de Dortmund et les solidi milanais (COM et M/D/COMOB: l'apport de la mesure)*, "Histoire & Mesure," 1 (1986) 3/4, 229-238.

features an abbreviation of the mint name (e.g., MD – Mediolanum) along with the abbreviated form OB.

Of particular significance is the commonly noted fact that this medallion is the only gold coin piece that depicts the portrait of Theoderic the Great. It should also be stressed that the right to issue gold coinage belonged to no other authority than the emperor. Hence, a handful of questions may be asked here: when and by whom was this medallion minted? If this was done on Theoderic's orders, it is worth considering the king's actual position and how he could have afforded undertaking such an act of disloyalty or independence. Was this particular medal a kind of a convenient tool of political propaganda? The obverse of the medallion represents King Theoderic's bust, shown in a full frontal position. The garments that can be seen include a shining scale armour (cuirass), covered with a paludamentum fastened with a fibula on his right shoulder. His hairstyle is rich and elegant, face round with clearly delineated eyes, with a slightly "puffed up" look, clean shaven, with eyebrows touching. His nose is long, mouth full, no headgear, neck clearly delineated. The king's right hand is raised, a globe resting on his left hand; on the globe: a small statue of *Victoria* (crowned),¹² holding a laurel wreath in her right hand and a palm leaf in her left. The inscription in the surround reads: REXTHEODERICV SPIVSPRINCIS.¹³

¹² For the evolution of the Victoria image in coinage, see A. R. Bellinger, M. A. Berlincourt, *Victory as a coin type*, New York: American Numismatic Society 1962.

¹³ Magdalena Mączyńska gives a completely different reading of the legend, implausible and incongruous in view of the fact that the interpretation of the obverse and reverse inscriptions was determined a long time ago, namely REX THEODERICH; cf. M. Mączyńska, *Wędrówki Ludów. Historia niespokojnej epoki IV i V wieku*, PWN Warszawa-Kraków 1996, p. 219. Unfortunately, in the latest edition of her book, entitled *Światło z popiołu. Wędrówki ludów w Europie w IV i V wieku* (TRIO 2013), the author does not rectify this misunderstanding. There are many hypotheses on how to interpret this inscription. The first three segments of the inscription are undisputed: REX

The reverse depicts a figure of *Victoria*, in profile, shown at the centre of the composition and resting her right foot on the globe. Her right hand, holding a laurel wreath, is raised, while the left one holds a palm leaf resting against her arm. This representation of *Victoria* on the reverse bears resemblance to the images of the same goddess on the silver and bronze coins of Theoderic, which would be one of the possible reasons for attributing this medallion to the mint of Rome.¹⁴ The surround reads as follows: REXTHEODERICVSVICTORGENTIVM COMOB, which is rendered as REX THEODERICVS VICTOR GENTIVM. The inscription COMOB can be seen in the exergue. On the reverse side, in the middle, a fastening hasp is attached (soldered) horizontally.¹⁵ The execution technique and the epigraphic details would point to the fact that the both sides of the medallion are the work of one minter. Some scholars argue that IVS GENTIVM should be linked with the triumphal character of Theoderic's arrival at Rome in the year 500,¹⁶ but there is no evidence to support this hypothesis.

THEODERICVS PIVS, but there is a problem with the final word, which E. A. Stückelberg interprets not only as PRINCIS, but as an abbreviation of princeps, and then the letters I and S should be rendered as: juvenutius senatus, juvante salvatore, inclyta stirpe, imperator salutatus. Cf. E. A. Stückelberg, *Les titres de Théodoric*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 11 (1898), 63-66. In addition, T. Allara considers PRINC as an abbreviation of princis, and renders the letter I as iustus, ilustrissimus, indulgentissimus, invictus, invictissimus, while the S as santissimus, serenissimus, sempiternus. I would opt for rendering the inscription as pius princeps imperator salutatus. Cf. T. Allara, *Ancora sui titoli di Teoderico*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 11 (1898), 67-74.

¹⁴ Cf. W. W. Wroth, *Catalogue of the coins*, 54.

¹⁵ Cf. J. M. Fagerlie, *Late Roman and Byzantine solidi found in Sweden and Denmark*, New York 1967, 4; E. Konik, *Roman suspension-coins found in Silesia*, "Eos" 54 (1964), 307-309.

¹⁶ Cf. A. Serra, *Una riflessione sul Medaglione di Teoderico*, [in:] *Rex Theodericus. Il Medaglione d'oro di Morro d'Alba*, ed. C. Barsanti, A. Paribeni, S. Pedone, Roma 2008, 21-25.

Unfortunately, as long as we have no reliable sources for this medallion, all we are left with are just a set of more or less likely hypotheses. The first question that needs to be asked should concern the purpose for which it was made. Most scholars are of the opinion¹⁷ that it was intended to be given to the senators, which was to have taken place in the year 500 on the occasion of Theoderic's triumphal *adventus* in Rome.¹⁸ As a matter of fact, the ruler is indeed portrayed on the coin as a young person, which may be of course just an idealized image. It is not very likely that the king could have given one medallion to all the senators, assuming of course that only one piece was struck, which we do not know. If Theoderic should have ordered the striking of a gold medallion with his own image, he must have already enjoyed a position of influence. Perhaps, this act was designed to assert his role in the East-West politics. Or is it possible that it may have been the other way round, with the medallion being a gift of the Senate presented to Theoderic as a token of gratitude? In any case, it is possible to connect the presentation of the medallion, the year 500 (regardless of to whom it was presented, as Theoderic spent around half a year in Rome at that time), and the double representation of *Victoria*.

Another interesting thing about this object is the inscription divided by the top of Theoderic's head in the legend of the obverse (REXTHEODERICVSPIVSPRINCIS). As Maciej Salamon observes: "Unlike the continuous inscription, the divided legend above the figure's head was, in the 4th century, a sign of higher regard, and therefore of a higher stature, even though there

¹⁷ Cf. P. Grierson, *The Date of the Gold Medallion of Theoderic the Great*, 19-26.

¹⁸ Cf. M. Ozóg, *Inter duas potestates. The Religious Policy of Theoderic the Great*, trans. M. Fijak, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2016, 92-93.

were exceptions to this rule (...) when the emperors would bear the equal titles, the differentiation between the legends provided a clue on the relation between the respective co-rulers.”¹⁹ In this case, however, in the late 5th century, we have a barbarian ruler, and the emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire, but perhaps it may have been one of the circumstances indicative of Theoderic’s political position at the time.

The tradition of presenting a statuette of *Victoria* by the Roman Senate dates back to the year 238. There was no rule to how this symbol was used in practice: *Victoria* was represented alongside the emperor dressed, variously, in military or civil attire. Constantine appeared with the statue in public during his two visits to Rome, in the years 312 and 315. His sons would follow in his footsteps. On the medal of Constantius II, the Constantinopolitan deity Tyche is shown holding a small statue of *Victoria* in her hand. Since the late 4th century, the *victoriola* had been used as the symbol of the Roman Senate.²⁰

It may be assumed that the Senate presented Theoderic with the statuette, as a sign of loyalty and obedience to him as King of Italy, just as they would have done towards the emperor. In this manner, the Senate did not act against the emperor as Theoderic used the title REX. This term was used exclusively with reference to barbarian rulers,²¹ which some scholars take as

¹⁹ M. Salamon, *Numizmatyka*, [in:] *Vademecum historyka starożytnej Grecji i Rzymu*, ed. E. Wipszycka, vol. 3, Warszawa 1999, 568.

²⁰ Cf. M. R. Alföldi, *Il Medaglione d’oro di Teodorico*, “*Rivista Italiana di Numismatica*”, 80 (1978), 136-139.

²¹ Cf. A. Alföldi, *Materialien zur Klassifizierung der gleichzeitigen Nachahmungen von römischen Münzen aus Ungarn und den Nachbarländern, III, Nachahmungen römischen Goldmedaillons als germanischer Halsschmuck*, “*Numizmatikai Közlöny*,” 28-29 (1929-1930), 15-17; M. R. Alföldi, *Il Medaglione d’oro*, 138-140; M. Reydellet, *La royauté dans la littérature latine de Sidoine Apollinaire à Isidore de Séville*,

proof of the view that the legend of the medallion must have been the commissioned work performed by a Germanic engraver, reflecting the *interpretatio barbarica* of the emperor's scope of authority.²² In my opinion, an attempt to draw a link between the term REX and the reputed non-Roman origin of the medallion should be approached with caution. There is no reason to deny that the engraver may have been a Roman who received a commission to perform the work according to the specific image requirements from Theoderic's milieu, the Senate, or someone else, as we do not know it for certain. The question remains if the Senate presented Theoderic with the statuette of *Victoria*, they may have possibly performed a similar act with a commemorative gold coin, struck as one special piece to make it unique. It is known that the coinage of solidi was reserved for the emperor (they were minted in the emperor's name only).

Another element connecting the medallion, the figure of Theoderic, and the events of the year 500 is the palm (a palm image is represented on the *multiplum* twice). The author of *Excerpta Valesiana* reports on Theoderic's arrival and the events of 500 as follows:

Then coming to Rome and entering it, he appeared in the senate, and addressed the people at The Palm, promising that with God's help he would keep inviolate whatever the former Roman emperors had decreed.²³

"Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes de Rome" 243 (1981), 22-46; A. Bursche, *Złote medaliony rzymskie*, 219.

²² Cf. A. Bursche, *Złote medaliony rzymskie*, 221.

²³ *Excerpta Valesiana* 12,65, trans. J. C. Rolfe,

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Excerpta_Valesiana/2*.html

The location *ad Palmam* was situated at the *Forum Romanum*, near the seat of the Senate. At that time, Fulgentius of Ruspe was present in Rome, when *fuit in Urbe maximum gaudium*, as his hagiographer notes, and had the opportunity to listen to Theoderic's speech, addressed to the people of Rome, with all the ceremony and in the presence of the entire Curia, at the place called "Golden Palm."²⁴ The name "golden palm" comes most likely from the statue of *Victoria*, with a golden palm leaf in her hand, standing there.²⁵ The hagiographer confirms the anonymous author's mention of a rather amicable, electoral (to use the modern phrase) speech, full of promises which no one would really take in earnest later on (the author calls them *favores*). Perhaps it was then and there that the king of the Ostrogoths proclaimed the *Edictum Theoderici* – if we assume that he is the author of the edict. Anonimus Valesianus mentions his pledge to preserve the imperial laws,²⁶ as evident in the sentence cited above, which may be also understood as alluding to a written confirmation by the ruler. On the other hand, of course, this may have been just a coincidence. The *Domus ad Palmam*, located near the *Porticus Curva* at the Forum Traiani, was the place where imperial edicts, such as the Theodosian Code, were announced in public. In fact, however, citizens of Rome would speak of the Forum Traiani in the sense of the Forum Romanum.²⁷

Another idea behind the minting of the medal in the year 500 was the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the ruler's reign or the recent "victory

²⁴ Cf. *Acta Sanctorum*, Januarius, vol. 1, 37 (in 1 Januarii, cap. XIII), PL 65, 130-131.

²⁵ Cf. M. Vitiello, *Teoderico a Roma. Politica, amministrazione e propaganda nell' "adventus" dell'anno 500. Considerazioni sull' "Anonimo Valesiano II"*, "Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte" 1 (2004) vol. 53, 76.

²⁶ *Excerpta Valesiana* 12,66.

²⁷ Cf. S. Ball Platner, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, London 1929, 187.

over the unnamed barbarians.”²⁸ As can be seen, the medallion bears no inscription referring to any celebration or ceremony in connection with the 30th anniversary of the reign, which is something that we can only hypothetically assume, or any other “round” anniversary that would have called for such celebrations. If the *multiplum* had been struck on the occasion of the 30th anniversary, the inscription VOT XXX or ANNO XXX would have very likely been there. Suggestions that the makers of the coin die did not know how or were unable to make such an inscription are simply untenable. According to M. R. Alföldi’s apparently unlikely hypothesis, the medallion might have belonged to a high-ranking Gothic commander from Theoderic’s inner circle, who served in the units charged with the protection of the coast and was buried in the area of one of the main harbours of the military flotilla, as supposedly attested by the finding of the artefact inside the sepulchral complex.²⁹ It was intended to be presented as a gift. Unfortunately, this hypothetical argumentation is not based on any evidence. As a matter of fact, medallions did perform a special role in the foreign policy of the Empire and were presented as gifts by various emperors, also as tributary payments (*largitiones*) in the territories of the Barbaricum.³⁰ As Gregory of Tours recounts, Chilperic received a gold medallion, equivalent to the weight of a Roman pound (327 g), from the emperor Tiberius II Constantine in 581, which would have been perceived as an act reportedly equal to the orders

²⁸ H. Wolfram, *Geschichte der Goten*, München 1979, 350.

²⁹ Cf. M. R. Alföldi, *Das Goldmultiplum Theoderichs des Grossen neue Überlegungen*, “Rivista Italiana di Numismatica” 90 (1988), 371. It is repeated, in a similar manner, in R. Pardi, *Le monete dei Goti*, [in:] *Rex Theodericus. Il Medaglione d’oro di Morro d’Alba*, ed. C. Barsanti, A. Paribeni, S. Pedone, Roma 2008, 14-15.

³⁰ Cf. M. R.-Alföldi, *Il Medaglione d’oro di Teodorico*, 213-214.

awarded to some barbarian commanders for their services to the emperor.³¹ However, mentions referring to the emperor awarding a medallion to a foreign ruler can be found only in Gregory of Tours' *Chronicle*.³² Could King Theoderic have done the same? The hypothesis of a gift awarded to the Gothic general must also remain a hypothesis only, despite the fact that we know of many instances of medallions awarded or given as gifts.³³

Assuming that it was Theoderic who commissioned the making of this particular medal, some other dates may be taken into consideration as well, e.g., the years 505-515, when the relations with the Byzantine Empire were definitely not the best. The relations between the emperor and Theoderic aggravated when in 504 the king sent his troops to Illyria in order to repel an incursion by the Gepids, who invaded deep into the Empire's territory, as far as Sirmium in Pannonia. During that campaign, his general fought a battle with Sabinus, the commander of the imperial army, and won. In this instance, the years 508-509, the period of the victories over the Burgundians and Franks, could be assumed as a good moment to commission a gold coin in his own name and with the inscription VICTORGENTIUM. Some scholars argue that the most likely date of the *multiplum* should have been right before

³¹ Cf. Gregorius Turonensis, *Historiarum libri X*, B. Kursch, W. Arndt (ed.), MGH SRMer. I, 52-55, Hannover 1884.

³² In 1968, E. Konik commented that Tacitus had referred to the Roman practice of awarding medallions to foreign commanders and other tribal leaders. Cf. E. Konik, *Kryzys Imperium a barbarzyńcy na północ od Dunaju*, Pamiętnik X Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Lublinie 17-21 września 1968 r., Referaty I, Sekcje I-VI, 54. J. Wielowiejski holds a very different view and argues that such a mention cannot be found in any of Tacitus' works. Cf. J. Wielowiejski, *Uwagi o rozmieszczeniu znalezisk i funkcji rzymskich medalionów oraz monet adaptowanych do zawieszania*, "Wiadomości Numizmatyczne," 14 (1979) 3, 137. Cf. also J. Iluk, *Aspects économiques et politiques de la circulation de l'or au bas-empire*, Moneta Wetteren 2007.

³³ Cf. J. Wielowiejski, *Uwagi o rozmieszczeniu znalezisk*, 137-140.

Theoderic's death, i.e., the year 526. It would be difficult to say anything for certain about this proposition, as there may be some doubt here as well, indirectly connected with the tremissis of Burgundian king Gundobald (473-516), dated to the years 510-516. Notably, there is a supposition that Gundobald ordered the copying of the image design of Theoderic's medallion onto his own coin,³⁴ which must have taken place before Gundobald's death in 516. For this reason, the hypothetical dating of the *multiplum* to the year 526 would be unfounded.

As noted before, the medallion depicts Theoderic with *Victoria* in his hand. The image of the statuette standing on the globe may be identified as a symbol of authority. It is known that Theoderic took a long time soliciting for the recovery of the insignia which had been sent to Constantinople by Odoacer, and the statue of *Victoria* may be perceived here as a symbolic representation of the sceptre and a confirmation of his royal title by the emperor Anastasius, along with the insignia of power, which the author of the *Excerpta Valesiana* refers to, somewhat enigmatically, as the *ornamenta palatii*.³⁵ Among those, there may have been the purple cloak, an important *insignium* of authority. Based on what Jordanes reports in his account on this matter, Theoderic stopped living as a private person in the third year following his invasion of Italy and changed his clothes of a Gothic commander-in-chief for royal attire as the ruler of the Goths and Romans.³⁶

³⁴ Cf. P. Grierson, M. Blackburn, *Medieval European Coinage: With a Catalogue of the Coins in the Fitzwilliam Museum*, Cambridge. The Early Middle Ages (5th-10th centuries), Cambridge 1986, 34-35.

³⁵ Cf. *Excerpta Valesiana* 12. 64.

³⁶ Cf. Jordanes, *Getica*: MGH AA, V, pars prior, *Iordanis Romana et Getica*, T. Mommsen (ed.), Berolini 1882, 295.

On the medallion considered in the present text, Theoderic has a bracelet on his right wrist, raising his hand in a gesture of address. This imagery may be seen as imitative of representations of the Roman emperors as *pacator orbis*.³⁷ In turn, Germanic bracteates often feature the motif of ring/bracelet, which is also evocative of insignia.³⁸ Hilderic would also wear a gold bracelet on his right wrist, symbolic of his adherence to the royal family in accordance with Germanic tradition. Likewise, the Germanic custom of wearing long hair signified an attribute of authority of native descent.³⁹ Another element linked to the insignia of power, as shown on the *multiplum*, is a fibula with pendilia, which fastens together Theoderic's paludamentum as the *sacra insignia*. In this particular case, it can be seen that this artefact is a circular disc plate fibula, which was an attribute used solely by emperors (and by empresses, in the Byzantine era). Like the above-mentioned *sacra insignia*, it was reserved exclusively for the emperor,⁴⁰ signifying his authority. On the sardonyx gemma with a depiction of the conferring of the *nobilissimus* rank on the young (*caesar*) Valentinian III, Constantius is shown attaching a fibula on Valentinian's right shoulder, with Honorius holding a palm leaf over the child. Gold crossbow fibulae worn by other rulers, e.g., on the Stylicho diptych, can be seen as part of the imperial imagery only in very few cases.

The image depicted on a medallion was identified with the charisma and the majesty of the ruler it represented. Some of the imperial insignia

³⁷ Cf. P. Bastien, *Le buste monétaire des empereurs romains*, t. 2, Wetteren 1993, 559-572.

³⁸ Cf. H. Vierck, *Religion, Rang und Herrschaft im Spiegel der Tracht*, [in:] *Sachsen und Angelsachsen. Ausstellung des Helms-Museums*, ed. C. Ahrens, Hamburg 1978, 276-278.

³⁹ Cf. A. Bursche, *Złote medaliony rzymskie*, 206-207.

⁴⁰ Cf. Themistius, *Orationes* XI, ed. H. Schenkel. corr. G. Downey, A. F. Norman, t. 1, Bibl. Teub., Lipsiae 1965, 216.

or garments were treated as signs of prestige among Germanic peoples in Late Antiquity.⁴¹ The Ostrogoth rulers assumed a number of attributes connected with imperial authority, which would often become enshrined as images represented on coins. This would not mean that usurping the imperial insignia was Theoderic's objective, as attested, e.g., by his consistent use of the title REX.⁴² Therefore, it can be concluded that the medallions served as *sacra insignia* and *regalia insignia*, and were at the same time tools of political propaganda, which were used as "protoregalia."



Obverse of the medallion, Museo Nazionale Romano, fot. M. Oźóg

⁴¹ Cf. N. Fettich, *Der zweite Schatz von Szilágysomlyó*, "Archaeologia Hungarica" 8 (1932), 21-23.

⁴² Cf. Prokopios Kaisareus, *De bello gotico* I, 29.



Reverse of the medallion, Museo Nazionale Romano, fot. M. Ozóg

Bibliography:

1. Acta Sanctorum, Januarius, vol. 1, 37 (in 1 Ianuarii, cap. XIII), PL 65, 130-131.
2. *Excerpta Valesiana*, trans. J. C. Rolfe, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Excerpta_Valesiana/2*.html
3. Gregorius Turonensis, *Historiarum libri X*, B. Kursch, W. Arndt (ed.), MGH SRMer. I, 52-55, Hannover 1884.
4. Jordanes, *Getica*: MGH AA, V, pars prior, *Iordanis Romana et Getica*, T. Mommsen (ed.), Berolini 1882.
5. Prokopios Kaisareus, *De bello Gothico* III, 33, Procopii Caesariensis Opera Omnia, recognovit Jacobus Haury, vol. I, De bellis libri I-IV, editio stereotypa correctior addenda et corrigenda adiecit Gerhard Wirth, Lipsiae 1963.
6. Themistius, *Orationes* XI, ed. H. Schenkel. corr. G. Downey, A. F. Norman, t. 1, Bibl. Teub.,

Lipsiae 1965.

7. Alföldi A., *Materialien zur Klassifizierung der gleichzeitigen Nachahmungen von römischen Münzen aus Ungarn und den Nachbarländern, III, Nachahmungen römischen Goldmedaillons als germanischer Halsschmuck*, "Numizmatikai Közlöny," 28-29 (1929-1930), 8-23.
8. Alföldi M. R., *Das Goldmultiplum Theoderichs des Grossen neue Überlegungen*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 90 (1988), 367-372.
9. Alföldi M. R., *Il Medaglione d'oro di Teodorico*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica", 80 (1978), 133-142.
10. Allara T., *Ancora sui titoli di Teoderico*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 11 (1898), 67-74.
11. Bastien P., *Le buste monétaire des empereurs romains*, t. 2, Wetteren 1993.
12. Bastien P., *Les multiples d'or, de l'avènement de Dioclétien à la mort de Constantin. Essai de classement métrologique*, "Revue Numismatique" 6 (1972) no. 14, 49-82.
13. Bellinger A. R., Berlincourt M. A., *Victory as a coin type*, New York: American Numismatic Society 1962.
14. Bernareggi E., *Il medaglione d'oro di Teodorico*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 71 (1969), 89-106.
15. Bursche A., *Złote medaliony rzymskie w Barbaricum. Symbolika prestiżu i władzy społeczeństw barbarzyńskich u schyłku starożytności*, Warszawa: UW 1998.
16. Clay C. L., *Roman imperial medallions: the date and purpose of their issue*, [in:] *Actes du VIII^e Congres international de numismatique*, ed. H. A. Cahn, G. L. Rider, Paris 1976, 253-265.
17. Depeyrot G., *Le trésore de Dortmund et les solidi milanais (COM et M/D/COMOB: l'apport de la mesure)*, "Histoire & Mesure," 1 (1986) 3/4, 229-238.
18. Fagerlie J. M., *Late Roman and Byzantine solidi found in Sweden and Denmark*, New York 1967.
19. Fettich N., *Der zweite Schatz von Szilágysomlyó*, "Archaeologia Hungarica" 8 (1932), 21-23.
20. Garzya A., *Teodorico a Bisanzio*, "Sileno" 20 (1994), 241-251.
21. Gnecci F., *Medaglione d'oro di Teodorico*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 8 (1895), 149-165.
22. Grierson P., Blackburn M., *Medieval European Coinage: With a Catalogue of the Coins in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge. The Early Middle Ages (5th-10th centuries)*, Cambridge 1986.
23. Grierson P., *The Date of the Gold Medallion of Theoderic the Great*, "Hikui" 11 (1984),

- 19-26.
24. Grierson P., *Una moneta d'argento inedita di Teodorico il Grande*, "Numismatica" 1 (1960), 113-115.
25. Iluk J., *Aspects économiques et politiques de la circulation de l'or au bas-empire*, Moneta Wetteren 2007.
26. Konik E., *Kryzys Imperium a barbarzyńcy na północ od Dunaju*, Pamiętnik X Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Lublinie 17-21 września 1968 r., Referaty I, Sekcje I-VI, 51-59.
27. Konik E., *Roman suspension-coins found in Silesia*, "Eos" 54 (1964), 307-309.
28. Mączyńska M., *Wędrowki Ludów. Historia niespokojnej epoki IV i V wieku*, PWN Warszawa-Kraków 1996.
29. Ożóg M., *Inter duas potestates. The Religious Policy of Theoderic the Great*, trans. M. Fijak, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2016.
30. Pardi R., *Le monete dei Goti*, [in:] *Rex Theodericus. Il Medaglione d'oro di Morro d'Alba*, ed. C. Barsanti, A. Paribeni, S. Pedone, Roma 2008, 11-20.
31. Platner S. Ball, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, London 1929.
32. Reydellet M., *La royauté dans la littérature latine de Sidoine Apollinaire à Isidore de Séville*, "Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes de Rome" 243 (1981), 22-46.
33. Salamon M., *Numizmatyka*, [in:] *Vademecum historyka starożytnej Grecji i Rzymu*, ed. E. Wipszycka, vol. 3, Warszawa 1999, 490-584.
34. Sallet A. von, *Münzen und Medaillen (Handbücher der Königl. Museen zu Berlin)*, Berlin 1898.
35. Serra A., *Una riflessione sul Medaglione di Teoderico*, [in:] *Rex Theodericus. Il Medaglione d'oro di Morro d'Alba*, ed. C. Barsanti, A. Paribeni, S. Pedone, Roma 2008, 21-25.
36. Stückerberg E. A., *Les titres de Théodoric*, "Rivista Italiana di Numismatica" 11 (1898), 63-66.
37. Themistius, *Orationes XI*, ed. H. Schenkel. corr. G. Downey, A. F. Norman, t. 1, Bibl. Teub., Lipsiae 1965.
38. Vierck H., *Religion, Rang und Herrschaft im Spiegel der Tracht*, [in:] *Sachsen und Angelsachsen. Ausstellung des Helms-Museums*, ed. C. Ahrens, Hamburg 1978, 271-283.
39. Vitiello M., *Teoderico a Roma. Politica, amministrazione e propaganda nell "adventus" dell'anno 500. Considerazioni sull 'Anonimo Valesiano II'*, "Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte" 1 (2004) vol. 53, 73-120.
40. Wielowiejski J., *Uwagi o rozmieszczeniu znalezisk i funkcji rzymskich medalionów oraz monet adaptowanych do zawieszania*, "Wiadomości Numizmatyczne," 14 (1979) 3, 129-

145.

41. Wolfram H., *Geschichte der Goten*, München 1979.
42. Wroth W. W., *Catalogue of the coins of the Vandals, Ostrogoths and Lombards: and of the empires of Thessalonica, Nicaea and Trebizond in the British Museum*, London 1911.
43. Zanker P., *Augustus und die Macht der Bilder*, München 1997.

Jarosław Szczepański

University of Warsaw

Demeny Voting in Poland: Introduction to a Research Concept

Abstract

Demeny voting is one of less known ways to modify the classic approach to organizing democratic elections. This paper is an attempt at identifying a proper approach to studies on the possible impact of the demeny voting system on the Polish political system. Moreover, it is devoted to identifying other fields that require further research which should precede proper investigation of possible application of demeny voting in Poland. Secondary interest of the article is to pursue the connection between demeny voting and the ideal of deliberative democracy.

The author refers to the results of the 2015 general elections and Polish demographic information published by the Central Statistical Office of Poland. The analysis of the data may serve as of a first step towards determining a hypothetical impact of demeny voting on the Polish political system.

Key words: *demeny voting; Poland; political theory; deliberative democracy*

Introduction

Thinking about democracy is thinking not only about procedures but also about how one should be involved into them. Commonly, when talking about democracy, journalists and even politicians mostly mean by it the liberal democracy, while the political studies differentiate between various types of the concept. One of those is deliberative democracy¹ in which not only a numerical majority of voters above a certain age threshold should count, but also the voice of diverse social groups. After all, the main reason behind democracy is to create space for a multilog of groups of interest. The more diverse the multilog, the better. In this case, allowing to introduce a proxy for those who are not able to speak for themselves is not only an option, but even a necessity. The institution of a proxy can be extended to the limits by introducing one for the future generations – those who will carry the burden of the current political decisions. Or, in other words, introducing a proxy for the as yet unborn. Leaving those extreme proposals aside, let us elaborate on and investigate demeny voting as a way of introducing a proxy for the young generations.

Even though the interest in organizing voting systems in ways examined in this paper is rather negligible in Europe², it has been discussed in Japan. In the Far East, a number of scientific papers have been published in this area, preceded by an experiment involving modelling of the new voting

¹ M. Tobiasz, *Demokracja deliberowana*, in: *Reprezentacja polityczna* ed. T. Żyro, Warszawa 2015.

² Although demeny voting was discussed in first half of the 20th century in European countries such as France and Germany.

system³. Nonetheless, there is no actual empirical evidence demonstrating the implications of demeny voting. Experiments such as the one performed by Oguro, Shimasawa, Aoki, and Oshio in 2012 using an overlapping generations model show that introducing demeny voting may decrease the tax burden of the working generation, but was it not sufficient to produce a general projection⁴.

The Japanese experiment brought up questions about changing patterns of electoral behaviors, differences between male and female proxy voters as well as whether ultimately outcomes of demeny voting reflect the interest of future generations. In this paper, I would like to investigate the possible approach to projecting demeny voting in Poland. In that case I would like to examine fields of research connected with the main issue and indicate necessary analyses that should be conducted in order to predict its impact.

Methods

In the course of the research, databases of the Central Statistical Office of Poland, as well as of the Public Opinion Research Center were searched for information on demographic indicators used in surveys about electoral behaviors. The main reason behind the research was to determine the type of performed surveys, type of available data as well as to analyze whether it is sufficient or not to design a simulation of the impact of demeny voting

³ Y. Kamij, Y. Hizen, T. Saijo, *Hearing the voice of future generations: A laboratory experiment of "demeny voting"*, "Social Design Engineering Series" 2015; R. Vaithianathan, R. Aoki, E. Sbair, *Support for Franchise Extension for Children: Evidence on Japanese Attitude to Demeny Voting*, Hitotsubashi University Repository 2013; P. Demeny, R. Aoki, I. Makihara, J. Ushiro, N. Yanagawa, *Demeny Voting and Its Impact. NIRA Round-Table*, Hitotsubashi University Repository 2011.

⁴ Y. Kamij, Y. Hizen, T. Saijo, *Hearing the voice of future generations: A laboratory experiment of "demeny voting"*, "Social Design Engineering Series" 2015, p. 3.

on the Polish political system. Another source was the Report on Large Families in Poland⁵ (Polish: *Rodziny wielodzietne w Polsce 2016. Raport*) prepared by the Association of Large Families “Three plus” in cooperation with Ipsos Poland. It was the first general survey of large families in Poland performed in 2016. The analysis of this document was focused on usability of the data for the purpose of projecting voting patterns and eagerness to participate in elections by parents in large families. It was also to verify the popular thesis that large families in Poland hold conservative or social conservative views and therefore are prone to vote for the parties perceived as right wing in Poland.

Results

The outcome of the research shows that the available data is not sufficient to perform satisfying projections for the introduction of the demerit voting in Poland. First of all, the surveys on large families included in the databases of the Central Statistical Office of Poland, as well as the Public Opinion Research Center focus on on their economic situation. Most of the available data on large families is connected with the problem of poverty⁶. Indeed, the research conducted in Poland, especially in the subfield of political sciences such as analyzing public policies, is focused on investigating large families from the economic perspective. There is little (if any) interest in performing a large survey on the political behavior,

⁵ *Rodziny wielodzietne w Polsce 2016. Raport*, Warszawa 2016.

⁶ In GUS database e.g.: *Zasięg ubóstwa materialnego w 2005 r.* (The range of material poverty in 2005); *Benficyjenci środowiskowej pomocy społecznej 2014 r.* (Beneficiaries of community social aid in 2014); *Benficyjenci środowiskowej pomocy społecznej 2015 r.* (Beneficiaries of community social aid in 2015); *Benficyjenci środowiskowej pomocy społecznej 2016 r.* (Beneficiaries of community social aid in 2016); *Ubóstwo ekonomiczne w Polsce w 2014 r.* (Economic poverty in Poland in 2014). In CBOS database e.g.: *Komu w Polsce żyje się najtrudniej?* (Who has the hardest life in Poland?).

political self-determination or impact of certain political doctrines on the members of large families.


The above diagnosis has been confirmed after investigating the database in search of surveys on electoral behavior⁷. The electorate is not being analyzed according to their family status (e.g. a nuclear or a large family) or the number of children. Surveys take into account traditional factors such as the level of education, income, or the place of living. The approach to demerit voting, in these circumstances, would require conducting basic surveys that would determine the profile of voters from large families. In a report entitled *Who the voters are, or the socio-demographic portrayal of the largest potential electorates* words such as “child”, “children”, “family” do not appear even once. That shows how the current electoral system has determined the way of thinking about voters and whose interest politicians should bear in mind during campaigns. The voice of the guardians of the future generations (namely parents) – who under the doctrine of deliberative democracy could act as proxies – are not visible in the reports and surveys.

Due to this fact, the report on large families in Poland from 2016 can be seen as a unique source of information that can be useful in projecting research on the application of demerit voting in Poland. The authors of the report indicated that an average large family in Poland has 4 children living

⁷ In CBOS database e.g.: *Kim są zamierzający głosować w wyborach do Sejmu, ale niezdecydowani, kogo poprzeć* (Who are those intending to vote but still undecided in the elections to the Sejm?); *Kim są wyborcy, czyli społeczno-demograficzne portrety największych potencjalnych elektoratów* (Who the voters are, or the socio-demographic portrayal of the largest potential electorates).

under the same roof with their parents. However, the report mentions children under the age of 24 years and so some of them are eligible to vote.

Figure 1 - Children under the age of 24 living with parents



Source: Rodziny wielodzietne w Polsce 2016. Raport, Warszawa 2016, p. 2.


The Polish Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy indicated that in 2016 there were 520,000 large families having 3 or more children, with the total number of people living in such families amounting to 2,700,000. Those figures imply that such families included on average of 5.19 person, i.e. about 3 children per one large family. This number refers only to children who are minors.

The report indicated that 64% of all large family couples contracted church marriage, 20% - civil marriage, and 10% lived in informal partnerships. It is worth noticing that in the Polish society, contracting a

church marriage does not automatically imply sympathizing with conservative or right-wing views. It is safe to say that a large family is correlated with the stability of a formal partnership.

Other piece of information that can be useful in modeling the impact of demerit voting is regional distribution of large families. The highest percentage of such families lived in Eastern and Southern Poland (22% and 20% respectively). In other parts of Poland, the figures were as follows: Central Poland: 18%, Northern Poland: 16%, North-Western Poland: 15% and South-Western Poland: 8%. The percentage split in geographic regions is important as voters supporting major political parties are not distributed evenly throughout the country. The eastern, southern and central regions are dominated by the Law and Justice party. There lives about 60% of large families in those regions. Adding to that, in the northern region, in places with high support for or dominated by Law and Justice, there lives about 76% of large families.

Figure 2 - Regions of Poland as shown in the report and the outcome of the last general elections of 2015



General elections map: blue indicates support for Law and Justice, orange for Civil Platform.

Source: Rodziny wielodzietne w Polsce 2016. Raport, Warszawa 2016, p. 4; wyborynamapie.pl.

Lastly, the report indicates the willingness to participate in local, general and presidential elections among the members of large families. The numbers are as follows: 60%, 54% and 67% respectively. Matching those

numbers with the outcomes of respective elections one can say that the members of large families are more prone to participate in democratic procedures. During the last local elections in 2014 the voter turnout rate was 47.40% in the first round and 39.97% in the second. During the last general elections in 2015 it was 50.92%. And during the last presidential elections in 2015 it was 48.96% in the first round and 55.34% in the second. The sole numbers suggest that the hypothetical impact of large families voting according to the demeny voting system on the results of local and presidential elections is worth initial research.

As a conclusion it must be pointed out that the available data is not sufficient to perform research or simulations of the impact of demeny voting on the Polish political system. Basic surveys and qualitative research on families that would answer questions about the connection of the political affiliation with the number of children are still to be conducted. Polish researchers could also consider performing a similar simulation to the one performed in Japan in order to investigate the question of changing voting patterns under demeny voting system.

All the above studies might be carried out under the doctrine of deliberative democracy. In that case parents – the holders of additional votes (or the fraction of the votes – if they were to be split evenly between father and mother) should be seen as the proxies for the future generations. The proxies who would serve as the voice of those who are not eligible to cast a vote, but whose narrative should be included in the Polish deliberative democracy.


Discussion

The analysis of the available research data brings up a question about the possible impact of the studied phenomenon and gives some hints on where to look for answers to it. The popular opinion that social conservative parties such as Law and Justice are supported by large families is yet to be verified. The impact on the general elections might not be as striking even though the turnout rate among the voters from large families is similar to the general one. Moreover, the percentage of children living in large families in comparison to the whole population of children basing on the data shown above and the ones from the Central Statistical Office of Poland is not favourable with respect to the first group.

According to the Central Statistical Office of Poland, in 2015 there lived more than 6,876,000 children in Poland in the age between 0-17 years⁸. In the same year, 15,595,335 (50.92% eligible to vote) of Poles casted their votes in general elections, of which 15,200,671 were valid. If one applies the principle of demeny voting to that elections, no less than 3,400,000 additional, proxy votes would have been cast. Assuming a slightly higher turnout among large family members and the geographical distribution the Law and Justice party might have secured an even better final result. And following this logic, the presidential elections in the same year could have resulted in an easy victory of Andrzej Duda, as large families from the regions dominated by Law and Justice would have provided additional votes.

⁸ <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/ludnosc/ludnosc-piramida/>

Figure 3 - Population By Sex And Age In 2016



Source: Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2017, Warsaw 2017, p. 511.

Yet, the problem with demeny voting is that all the statements above are pure speculations as there has been no support (and demand) for research that could determine the impact of this institution on the Polish political system. Furthermore, all forecasts of the Central Statistical Office of Poland concerning the number of children in years after the last general census of

2011 proved to be wrong and underestimated⁹. In such circumstances, predictions about the impact of demerit voting on the future elections are hard to perform given the current state of research.

However, due to the general demographic situation in Europe, such topics as demerit voting may move to the mainstream of political debates. At the same time, an institution like that could be seen as part of the state's public policy aimed at encouraging people to have more children. This in turn would ensure their political interest at the ballot box. On the other hand, continuous waves of democracy give the right to vote or to participate in public deliberations to ever broader groups. Applying proxies for the future generations of voters might be seen as a step towards an even more democratic system.

In Japan the discussions about the ways of representing the interest of future generations have been launched. As Keiichiro Kobayashii¹⁰ states: "future design research may change the nature of human knowledge in a broad spectrum of fields including not only social science but also neuroscience and political philosophy".

⁹ The predictions are available at:

<http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/ludnosc/ludnosc-piramida/>.

Comparing number of children predicted to be born in 2017 with actual number of birth, the underestimation is as high as 57 130. With estimation of 345 870 the mistake was at the rate of 16.5%.

¹⁰ Keiichiro Kobaashii, *How to Represent the Interests of Future Generations Now*, <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2018/interests-of-future-generations>

Bibliography:

1. M. Tobiasz, *Demokracja deliberowana*, w: *Reprezentacja polityczna* ed. T. Żyro, Warszawa 2015;
2. Y. Kamij, Y. Hizen, T. Saijo, *Hearing the voice of future generations: A laboratory experiment of "demeny voting"*, "Social Design Engineering Series" 2015;
3. R. Vaithianathan, R. Aoki, E. Sbai, *Support for Franchise Extension for Children: Evidence on Japanese Attitude to Demeny Voting*, Hitotsubashi University Repository 2013;
4. P. Demeny, R. Aoki, I. Makihara, J. Ushiro, N. Yanagawa, *Demeny Voting and Its Impact. NIRA Round-Table*, Hitotsubashi University Repository 2011;
5. *Rodziny wielodzietne w Polsce 2016. Raport*, Warszawa 2016;
6. *Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2017*, Warsaw 2017;
7. Keiichiro Kobaashii, *How to Represent the Interests of Future Generations Now*, <http://www.tokyoofoundation.org/en/articles/2018/interests-of-future-generations>.

Marcin Olechowski
War Studies University

The mechanism and instruments of psychological warfare

Abstract

This article presented mechanism and instruments of contemporary psychological warfare. Phenomenon of propaganda will be discussed and also the role of its main carrier: mass media. In the further part of the work cyberspace will be presented as other large area of contest for influence on societies. Manipulation of social consciousness, which is conducted by state regimes and other participators of international relations, is permanent element of contemporary international environment. That is the reason why it is so important to know mechanism of it.

Słowa kluczowe: *psychological warfare, psychological operations, Infowar, PSYOPS, PsyWar, public diplomacy, propaganda, mass media, social engineering*

Introduction

Psychological warfare could be defined as a system of operations to make an influence on society to achieve own goals. This term was introduced during II World War and spread during the Cold War, however this type of operations was conducted yet in ancient ages. Today we may see a tendency to resign of the term „psychological warfare”, which raises pejorative associations, and to camouflage this type of activities by other terms, like psychological operations, public diplomacy, international information. The main goal of this operations- to manipulate own and other societies- is the same, only it was changed and developed instruments of it. This article presents mechanism and instruments of contemporary psychological warfare, included its main tool- propaganda. There will be discussed also the new area of the warfare for „brain and hearts”, a cyberspace.

1. Manipulation of consciousness - social engineering

As it was told, psychological warfare is a system of operations to make an influence on society to achieve own goals. Its mechanism bases on manipulation of consciousness and bringing properly targeted information and misinformation¹.

Individual consciousness consist of rational and emotional element, the second one usually plays more important role. For psychological warfare there are important such elements of personality, as communication and

¹ D. Wołkogonow, *Wojna psychologiczna*, Warszawa 1986, p. 125.

cognitive abilities and the ability to function in society². Because of, that it is difficult to adjust and direct the coverage to each person individually, psychological operations are conducted towards social groups and societies. That is the reason, why social consciousness is a main object of influence in psychological warfare. Dmitri Volkogonov (head of the Department of Special Propaganda and at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s deputy head of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy) defined it as: „the whole of ideas, views, imaginations existing in society in a given period and reflecting social reality ". It is not a simply set of individual units' consciousness, but the bigger wholeness, which functions above it³. One of the forms of social consciousness is a public opinion, which appears in the context of current political and social events. Professor Franciszek Ryszka defined it as „a reaction of human groups in macro scale on global and particular political actions, which express in approval or disapproval for political actions or events, which in this opinion decide about policy, its directions and course"⁴. Manipulation of consciousness is conducted, using the achievements of social, psychological and derivative sciences, among which the most important is social engineering, a practical science about different methods of social influence, which are called sociotechnics⁵. There are information and mechanical sociotechnics. Mechanical sociotechnics included physical influence on human, his state of consciousness. It may be violence, terror, rape, technical (like for example ultrasounds), chemical (drugs) means of

² Ibidem, p. 41-44.

³ Ibidem, p. 17.

⁴ B. Dobek-Ostrowska, Janina Faras, Beata Ociepka, *Teoria i praktyka propagandy*, Wrocław 1997, p. 68.

⁵ P. Pawełczyk, Dorota Piontek, *Socjotechnika w komunikowaniu politycznym*, Poznań 1999, p. 63.

influencing emotions and mental states. Because of their controversies, for psychological warfare more important are information sociotechnics. They can be reduced to three forms of action: persuasion, manipulation, facilitating activities.

Facilitating activities should create situation, in which it will be more successful to influence on recipient. The base for further operations may be prepared earlier, for example during the process of indoctrination⁶. By the persuasion sender tries to influence the opinions and behaves of recipient, who knows their intentions⁷. In manipulation recipient does not know intentions of sender. Manipulation bases especially on permanent operation by slogans and definitions, symbols, pictures and specially prepared information and disinformation.⁸

Disinformation is based on introducing false views and beliefs into the consciousness. It is not always lie: specially prepared informations also could be an instrument of it, because „information is disinformation too”⁹. Words, sounds and pictures can make influence on thinks, emotions, and as a result, on people's views and behaviors. However, firstly they should be specially used, prepared and promoted. Information sociotechnics are closely related by phenomenon of propaganda.

Propaganda as an instrument of psychological warfare

Psychological warfare is sometimes called “special propaganda”, because propaganda is a main instrument of it. Propaganda is usually define as

⁶ V. Volkoff, *Dezinformacja- oręż wojny*, Warszawa 1991, p. 9.

⁷ P. Pawełczyk, Dorota Piontek, *Socjotechnika...*, op. cit., p. 64-65.

⁸ D. Wołkogonow, *Wojna psychologiczna*, op. cit., p. 127.

⁹ V. Volkoff, *Dezinformacja*, p. 5-17.

intentional influence on humans and groups by information sociotechnics, in order to forced targeted attitudes, aspirations and behaves¹⁰. It is a process of control of information flow, managing the public opinion and manipulation of patterns of behavior.

It is possible to distinguish a few types of propaganda, based on different categories:

1. Distribution method: there is a direct propaganda (the message is sent directly from sender to the recipient and there are interactions between them) and an indirect propaganda (the coverage is sent from sender to the recipient through mass media). Owing to development of information technologies, especially Internet, differences between both types of propaganda are reduced and indirect propaganda gets some characteristics of direct¹¹.
2. Reception method: there is visual, auditive and audiovisual propaganda.
3. Recipient: there is internal propaganda (the coverage is sent to own auditory, it is often called „traditional propaganda”) and external propaganda (the message is sent to other auditoriums, it is often called special or subversive propaganda)¹².
4. Time of events and propaganda coverage about them: there is a pre-propaganda, an accompanying propaganda and a post-propaganda. The pre-propaganda should prepare auditory for event through consolidation of specific attitudes and views. In the accompanying propaganda the sender has to be ready for fast reactions for changing circumstances and for

¹⁰ E. Banaszkiwicz-Zygmunt [red.], PWN Leksykon. Media, Warszawa 2000, hasło „mass media”.

¹¹ B. Dobek-Ostrowska, J. Faras, B. Ociepka, *Teoria...* op. cit., p. 43-45.

¹² Ibidem, p. 35-37; Subversive propaganda is sometimes identified with a psychological war as such.

adapting the message content to them. The post-propaganda affects the recipient with consolidated opinions and is more difficult¹³.

5. Based on level of adulteration of content: there is white, black and gray propaganda. Informations in white propaganda are true, in grey propaganda informations don't have to be always true or precise. In black propaganda, which is often called „the big lie”, content is fake and has to mislead the recipient. A lot of scholar use this categories to define the type of the sender. With this approach, white propaganda come from the sender, which doesn't mask his identity. During grey propaganda sender may be identified correct, but he is not known at the moment. In black propaganda sender stay unknown, all power of his influence bases on convincing the recipient, that his identity is other, than in reality¹⁴. With this approach there is some trap, because correct identified sender doesn't sent always true coverage and conversely, messages from small reliable source must not always be false. Another type of propaganda is a masking propaganda. Sender tries to distract the recipient from specific problems and concentrate him on something else. There is also difference between propaganda and agitation. Propaganda concentrate recipients attention on long-term goals and agitation is used to encourage to specific, immediate actions and is carried out directly¹⁵.

¹³ B. Dobek-Ostrowska, J. Faras, B. Ociepka, *Teoria...* op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 33-34, According to the definition from the doctrine AJP 3.7, the propagator of gray propaganda is always unknown..

¹⁵ O. Thomson, *Historia Propagandy*, Warszawa 2001, p. 12.

Mass media as a main tool of psychological warfare

Characteristic of mass media and media coverage

A main role in psychological warfare has the indirect propaganda. Its carrier are mass media, which have very important place in states policy. The term „mass media" was introduced in Western in the same period as „psychological warfare". It is used to define technical devices and institutions (private senders, public agencies etc.), which manage them. They are used to send message to numerous and varied auditory. As with propaganda, because of reception method, there are classified: auditive media (radio, and also electroacoustic stations or music tape/CD's), visual (press, posters, pictures, books and others) and audiovisual (television, cinema, VHS, DVD movies). Contemporary there is classified fourth format too, which concerns new mass media, first of them Internet.

Media coverage is mass, public, it is directed to all members of society, which want and have possibilities to receive it. Because of this mass communication is popular, simply and schematic. The recipient get through mass media an access to knowledge, entertainment and information¹⁶. Mass media are main source of information in information society, they are main instrument to form and to express public opinion¹⁷. This character of mass media is good expressed by Russian term to name them, „средства массовой информации", „mass information facilities".

Dmitrij Wołkogonow specified 4 main functions of mass media:

¹⁶ E. Banaszkievicz-Zygmunt [red.], PWN Leksykon., op.cit., headword „mass media".

¹⁷ J. Potulski, *Wprowadzenie...*, op. cit., p. 368.

1. spreading knowledge about the world and providing information,
2. „social regulation and control"- a raising and a promotion of desirables behaves
3. promotion and enriching the culture;
4. an instrument of ideological warfare.

The last function is a result of 3 other.¹⁸ Image of reality created in mass media reflects interests of their principals and has an impact on social consciousness: ideas and behaviors, which are compatible with ideology of this principals. Mass media are also a „gatekeeper", a distributor and a controller of information flow¹⁹. Because of their importance, mass media have important role in states government policies.

Mechanism of influencing the mass media and media coverage

Rules about mass medias functioning are an effect of government's media policy. Media policy may be defined as „an activities of government and institutions and social organizations, which create legal, political and economic framework conditions of mass media functioning, according to purposes from own values system, actual social-economic conditions and social needs and interests"²⁰. Media policy is connected by information policy. That are rules, which regulate creating, using, collecting and transmitting

¹⁸ D. Wołkogonow, *Wojna...*, op. cit., p. 151.

¹⁹ B. Dobek-Ostrowska, J. Faras, B. Ociepka, *Teoria...* op. cit., p. 58.

²⁰ E. Stasiak-Jazukiewicz, *Cele polityki medialnej UE*, w: http://ec.europa.eu/polska/news/opinie/121129_cele_polityki_medialnej_ue_pl.htm (dostęp 16.06.2015).

information between government and media institutions²¹. Besides, regardless of legal regulations, an impact on information flow rules, methods of its share, concealment and distribute have common practices and customs. Informational policy in state may be conducted on different ways, which depend from type of institution and specific situation. The stronger and more centralized is the power, the stronger it affects the media system. That affects to conduct by it psychological operations.²²

Governments have a lot of possibilities to make an impact on mass media. The easiest method to control contents in mass media is to create governments media institutions. It enables to full control of contents and to engage mass media to realize ideological goals of power. The main disadvantage of this institutions is, that they are often considered as a propaganda tube of regime by other subjects.

The main instrument to control contents in mass media is a censorship. There is indirect (positive) censorship and direct (negative) censorship. Direct censorship bases on blocking media access to specific information or preventing publication²³. It is used rather during psychological defense. Direct censorship is controversial in democratic society, it raises objections and can undermine confidence in the government. Indirect censorship is less controversial. It based on controlling the creation of information materials or on their own preparation and on control of disseminated of them.²⁴. That can

²¹ A. Ogonowska, *Polityka informacyjna UE na progu XXI wieku*, w: http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/3-2001_Ogonowska.pdf (dostęp 16.06.2015)

²² A. Zebrowski, *Walka...*, op. cit., p. 15.

²³ *Prawda, kłamstwo, cenzura i autocenzura*, in: „Problematyka militarna w wybranych zagranicznych środkach masowego przekazu”, nr. 3/97, Sztab Generalny Wojska Polskiego, Zarząd Rozpoznania i WRE, p. 22.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

be done for example by dedicated ministries of propaganda/information or by the other governmental institutions, like former United States Information Agency (USIA), which conducted American public diplomacy during cold war. Such instruments are also government-controlled press agencies, which collect and prepare information for other media²⁵.

Direct contact between government and media is provided by spokespersons and during press conferences. It may be especially important for power to keep information monopoly from war zone or zones of unusual events, like protests or terrorist attacks. As much as possible, government tries to control activities of journalists, reporters, correspondents in this areas to prevent getting and publishing of some information. State supports also some types of institutions, which may be classified as self-censorship. That are for example ethical codes, programs guidelines or organizations, which enable consultations of some publications with government. Authorities or well-indoctrinated society often put pressure on the media, what causes, that journalists are prompted to use self-censorship. Government may control media system in the state by such instruments, as material and financial support for some institutions or persons. A significant role is also played by the links between power centers and proprietors of the mass media. It is very often, that people associated with the authorities have performed some functions in media institutions, for example as board members or directors. Individual media support more or less certain political groups and their activities. Some media support actual power, some of them support opposition- that depends on their sympathy or personal connections. Authorities grant licenses to broadcasters and also they can cancel them,

²⁵ D. Wołkogonow, *Wojna...*, op. cit., p. 184-186.

when they find it necessary. Government can use the intelligence services to make an influence on mass media. They can recruit or intimidate journalists, fabricate materials or create pseudo-independent media.

Manipulation in mass media is conducted by construction of media coverage, using sociotechnic. The content of the media coverage should meet the following conditions: maximal emotional load, efficiency (the ability to match the message to the situation and recipient), clear indication of the recipient of the message, combining psychological impact and topicality of information²⁶. In the mass media seemingly neutral content (educational, entertainment, cultural and others) are combined with journalistic, information and other programs of a social, political and economic nature. First one serves to attract audiences and to make them more vulnerable to the propaganda impact of the remaining program²⁷. During the providing of information there are used linguistic manipulations, myths and stereotypes, thinking patterns, understatements, simplifications, appropriately selected titles, which are functioning in the social consciousness. There are created some slogans and schemes for propaganda use²⁸. Short, simply and plain, they are easy to remember and to distribute and they have big propaganda load. Other typical activities are stigmatization, password theft, forgery and rumor. In medias coverage there is discredited enemy institutions and management authorities. It can be used also an intimidation against the recipient, which means mental terror, which is about creating a sense of danger and atmosphere of tension. People under the influence of fear become inclined to

²⁶ D. Wołkogonow, *Wojna...*, op. cit., p. 157.

²⁷ A. C. Hansen, *USIA. Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age*, Nowy Jork 1984, p.1118.

²⁸ An example of this kind of slogans is the use of the words "junta", "Banderites", "fascists" in the propaganda of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine to describe their opponents.

agree for actions they would not agree to otherwise²⁹. Because of a lot of information from media the information noise phenomenon appears. It makes difficult for recipient to choose, which information are really important for him. A creation of media noise can also be a deliberate action to mask inconvenient information³⁰.

A black and white, simplified vision of the world is usually presented in the media narrative. There is a lot of exaggeration, a contrast between wonderful and happy „our” reality and negative, full of violence and poverty „their”. The manipulator should be careful not to succumb to his own disinformation, using this instrument.

Cyberspace as a new area of psychological warfare

The term „cyberspace” comes from W. Gibsons novel „Neuromancer” from 1984 year. It is usual defined as all virtual connections („non-spatial” in physical sense, no-material and non-geographic), which was created and functions through their material manifestations (computers and telecommunications infrastructure³¹. There are recognized 3 levels of cyberspace: material (physical), logistical (logical) and information (cognitive, social)³².

Creation and development of cyberspace was possible thanks to great progress in information technology, which started in second half of 20th century and led to the creation of computer networks, particularly to the

²⁹ D. Wołkogonow, *Wojna psychologiczna*, op. cit., p. 132-138.

³⁰ Z. Modrzejewski, *Operacje...*, op. cit., p. 33.

³¹ T. R. Aleksandrowicz, K. Liedel, *Społeczeństwo informacyjne...*, op. cit., p. 23.

³² Y. Harrel, *Rosyjska...*, op. cit., p. 33.

Internet. A genesis of Internet is in researches conducted by Pentagon to create distributed computer network, which could function during nuclear war, even if some of its elements would be destroyed. They led to the creation of a military computer network ARPANET. Internet was at beginning civil part of it. This genesis of Internet and the fact, that subjects from USA have still big control over this network, are controversial for a lot of other states, include Russia³³.

Computer networks are a main instrument, used by sending, collecting and processing the information. According to the opinion of authors of „US National Strategy for Cyberspace", cyberspace became a „nervous system of the state" and its economy and defense are depend from computer networks³⁴. It is not surprising, therefore, that states attaches to it a lot of importance. Cyberspace become new area of contest in international relations, it may be used in military dimension as new space of warfare, like ground, airspace, water and cosmos³⁵.

Cyberspace is a new area of information warfare, also in its spiritual aspect³⁶. Information technologies are used by conductors of psychological warfare as instruments to promote their own values³⁷. The importance of cyberspace for propaganda arises from the fact, that the Internet became a carrier of traditional mass media, at the same time, however, creating completely new communication possibilities, such as social media³⁸.

³³ Ibidem, p. 24-26.

³⁴ T. R. Aleksandrowicz, K. Liedel, *Spółeczeństwo informacyjne...*, op. cit., p. 24.

³⁵ Y. Harrel, *Rosyjska...*, op. cit., p.34.

³⁶ T. R. Aleksandrowicz, K. Liedel, *Spółeczeństwo informacyjne...*, op. cit., p. 35.

³⁷ Y. Harrel, *Rosyjska...*, op. cit., p.105.

³⁸ Z. Modrzejewski, *Operacje...*, op. cit., p. 126.

Media, which are distributed, using IT, are cheaper than traditional. They make possible of free communication in global scale, thanks to the increasing availability of necessary technical devices (like computers, mobile phones, tablets, etc.) and an infrastructure. New media can transmit practically any visual or auditive message, thereat they become the most flexible and universal means of mass communication. What is special in them, new media give a possibility to make interactions between sender and recipient and blurry the boundaries between them. It makes possibility of feedback appearance, what makes an illusion of direct communication. Bidirectionality of the message increases the power of propaganda influence³⁹.

There are some typical for cyberspace characteristics, which make difficult to make an influence on it by the state. That are: discretion (undetectability), variability, virality (quick spread), reproducibility, omnipresence, mischievousness, identification, fallaciousness, interactivity, volatility and unpredictability⁴⁰. In the cyberspace there were equalized opportunities between subjects with different potentials in the real world, thereat the importance of the state is decreasing, that creates a field for action for other entities, like terrorist organizations (cyberterrorism), or different „freelancers", hackers and hacktivists⁴¹.

A main problem for states sovereignty in this context, in opinion of dr Marek Madej, is a fact, that different process are carried out outside its borders and

³⁹ J. Nye, *Przyszłość siły*, op. cit., p. 202.

⁴⁰ Y. Harrel, *Rosyjska...*, op. cit., p. 35.

⁴¹ As a hacker there are defined a person, who tries to test their IT skills in practice by obtaining unauthorized access to data or devices. As "hacktivists" there are defined ideological motivated hackers. Both groups could be in service for state. J. Nye, *Przyszłość siły*, op. cit., p. 228-230 and: M. Madej, *Cyberterroryści, cyberprzestępcy i hakerzy*, in: J. Symonides (red.), *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń*, Warszawa 2010, p. 390 i 402.

jurisdiction, however, thanks to the connections in cyberspace, they exert a great influence on it. An activity of foreign hackers groups can lead to paralysis of states information system and make a serious influence on its security⁴². Accidents in Estonia in 2007 are a good example for it. A massive hackers strike blocked the servers of many state institutions, banks and the media. It is assumed that the Russian hackers are responsible for the attack and that they were inspired or supported by Russian Federations government, which was in the conflict with Estonians authorities over the monument of Soviet soldiers in Tallinn at this time⁴³.

Attack on Estonians servers showed the next question about operations in cyberspace: how they should be treated from the point of view of international law and whether a cyber-attack can be treated as an aggression? The most important problem in this question is, how can any activity in cyberspace affect the real world, in particular, cause physical damage and loss in people. It is connected by theoretical question, are the activities in cyberspace an element of soft or hard power?⁴⁴

This problems induced NATO experts to prepare a document „Tallin Manual of International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare". They adopted the principle of territorial jurisdiction. It means, that this state is responsible, on whose territory is the infrastructure, used by attackers⁴⁵.

⁴² Marek Madej, *Cyberterrorysty, cyberprzestępcy i hakerzy*, in: Janusz Symonides (red.), *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń*, Warszawa 2010, p. 390 i 402.

⁴³ Yannick Harrel, *Rosyjska....*, op. cit., p. 39.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 39.

⁴⁵ Piotr Rutkowski, *Strategia cyberbezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej- pilne wyzwania, niespieszna debata*, w: Krzysztof Liedel, Paulina Piasecka, Tomasz Aleksandrowicz (red.), *Sieciocentryczne bezpieczeństwo. Wojna, pokój i terroryzm w epoce informacji*, Warszawa 2014, p. 50.

Nowadays, in international discourse, it is assumed, that using a cyberspace to preach propaganda and intelligence activities is not usually a subject to the laws of war. For the other activities, which lead to effects in the real world, comparable to the use of other types of weapons, this law may be used. It was also assumed, that both types of activities could be a subject to the laws of war, if they would be conducted during hostilities, in parallel with others activities⁴⁶.

Despite all the above-mentioned circumstances, because of their potential, states have still an important position in cyberspace⁴⁷. A lot of them, especially world powers, developed its own cyberstrategies, or visions of policy in this area⁴⁸.

Initially cyberstrategies were mainly defensive, they should be an answer for potential threats in cyberspace. Nowadays, cyberstrategies contain also records about own offensive operations⁴⁹.

In published by White House in May 2011 document „International Strategy for Cyberspace" or in Pentagon's „The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy" from April 2015 there were shown the view of the US authorities on the issue of security in cyberspace⁵⁰. In this approach it is evident, that

⁴⁶ Tomasz R. Aleksandrowicz, Krzysztof Liedel, *Spółeczeństwo informacyjne...*, op. cit., p. 36.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 26.

⁴⁸ Yannick Harrel, *Rosyjska...*, op. cit., p.35-40 Government's cyberstrategy does not only refer to the actions of the armed forces. Within the framework of cyberstrategy the army conducts an electronic war, which can be considered as one of the elements of the information war.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 33.

⁵⁰ *The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy* z kwietnia 2015 roku, w:

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf,

International Strategy for Cyberspace z maja 2011 roku, w:

Americans has awareness of their own domination in the information technology sector and that they strive for its preservation. International cooperation in this aspect should base on acceptance by other entities the rule of „safe and reliable cyberspace“⁵¹.

Russian attitude to question the security in cyberspace is very interest also. It is a derivative of general attitude to informational warfare. It was presented primarily in Information Security Doctrines of Russian Federation from 2000 and from 2016 year. The cyberspace become for Russians a relay of civilization, than a technical system⁵². In Russian cyberstrategy the information function is in the foreground⁵³.

Summary

Mechanism of psychological warfare base on manipulation of consciousness, using achievements in social sciences, especially in social engineering. The main instrument of this influence is propaganda, which is disseminated by mass media. They are a main instrument to shape public opinion, also social consciousness is constructed basing on their coverage. Cyberspace is nowadays a new area of contest in this aspect. Development of information technologies created more possibilities to make an influence on the own and foreign societies and enables to conduct propaganda in global scale.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf

⁵¹ Yannick Harrel, *Rosyjska...*, op. cit., p. 124.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 64

⁵³ Ibidem p. 32.

Bibliography:

Documents:

1. Доктрина информационной безопасности Российской Федерации з 2000 року
2. Доктрина информационной безопасности Российской Федерации з 2016 року
3. Doktryna działań psychologicznych NATO AJP – 3.7 z 2005
4. Концептуальные взгляды на деятельность Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в информационном пространстве з 2011 року
5. Regulamin Wojny Psychologicznej Sił Lądowych Stanów Zjednoczonych Psychological Operations FM-33-1 z 1979 roku
6. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy z 2015 roku
7. War Report of the OSS z 1947 roku

Studies, monographs:

1. Banaszkiewicz-Zygmunt Edyta, PWN Leksykon. Media, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2000
2. Cull Nicholas J., The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, Cambridge University Press, Nowy Jork 2008
3. Darczevska Jolanta, Diabeł tkwi w szczegółach: wojna informacyjna w świetle doktryny wojennej Rosji, Wydawnictwo OSW, Warszawa 2015
4. Darczevska Jolanta, Rosyjskie siły zbrojne na froncie walki informacyjnej. Dokumenty strategiczne, Wydawnictwo OSW, Warszawa 2016
5. Dictionary of military terms, Greenhill Books, Londyn 1999
6. Dobek-Ostrowska Bogusława, Faras Janina, Ociepka Beata, Teoria i praktyka propagandy, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1997
7. Encyclopedia of international media and communications, Academic Press, Nowy Jork, 2003
8. Encyklopedia wojskowa, Wydawnictwo Bellona, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2007, tomy 1-2
9. Hansen Allen C., USIA. Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age, Praeger Publishers, Nowy Jork 1984
10. Harrel Yannick, Rosyjska cyberstrategia, Wydawnictwo DIG, Warszawa 2015

11. Kosseski A., Kuśmierski Stanisław (red.), Teoria i praktyka propagandy, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1985
12. Liedel Krzysztof, Piasecka Paulina, Aleksandrowicz Tomasz (red.), Sieciocentryczne bezpieczeństwo. Wojna, pokój i terroryzm w epoce informacji, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2014
13. Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa, Wydawnictwo MON, Warszawa 1971, tomy 1-3
14. Nowacki Gabriel, Organizacja i prowadzenie działań psychologicznych w wybranych państwach, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004
15. Modrzejewski Zbigniew, Operacje informacyjne, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2015
16. Nye Joseph, Przyszłość siły, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2012
17. Pawełczyk Piotr, Piontek Dorota, Socjotechnika w komunikowaniu politycznym, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa UAM, Poznań 1999
18. Potulski Jakub, Wprowadzenie do socjologii stosunków politycznych, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk, 2011
19. Rokiciński Krzysztof, Pac Bogdan, Operacje informacyjne w działaniach militarnych, Wydawnictwo J.P., Gdynia 2010
20. Skrzypczak Józef (red.), Popularna encyklopedia mass mediów, Wydawnictwo Kurpisz, Poznań 1999
21. Symonides Janusz (red.), Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń, Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2010
22. Szypra Ryszard, Militarne operacje informacyjne, Wydawnictwo AON, Warszawa 2003
23. Thomson Oliver, Historia Propagandy, Wydawnictwo Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 2001
24. Volkoff Vladimir, Dezinformacja- oręż wojny, Wydawnictwo Helikon, Warszawa 1991
25. Военный энциклопедический словарь, Военное издательство, Москва 1986
26. Wołkogonow Dmitrij, Wojna psychologiczna, Wydawnictwo MON, Warszawa 1986
27. Zebrowski Andrzej, Walka informacyjna w asymetrycznym środowisku bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Kraków 2016
28. Хочешь мира, победи мятежевойну! Творческое наследие Е.Э. Месснера, Русский путь/Военный университет, Москва 2005

Articles:

1. Aleksandrowicz Tomasz, Liedel Krzysztof, Społeczeństwo informacyjne-sieć-cyberprzestrzeń. Nowe zagrożenia, w: Liedel Krzysztof, Piasecka Paulina, Aleksandrowicz Tomasz (red.), Sieciocentryczne bezpieczeństwo. Wojna, pokój i terroryzm w epoce informacji, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2014
2. Boroch Robert, Agresja-wojna antropologiczna a nauki o kulturze – wielkie tematy kulturoznawstwa na marginesie krytycznej analizy dyskursu, w: Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje, Nr 22
3. Madej Marek, Cyberterroryści, cyberprzestępcy i hakerzy, w: Symonides Janusz (red.), Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń, Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2010
4. Olechowski Adam, Operacje psychologiczne w strategicznej wojnie informacyjnej, w: Stosunki Międzynarodowe, nr. 42-43, 04.06.2006
5. Rutkowski Piotr, Strategia cyberbezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej- pilne wyzwania, niespieszna debata, w: Krzysztof Liedel, Paulina Piasecka, Tomasz Aleksandrowicz (red.), Sieciocentryczne bezpieczeństwo. Wojna, pokój i terroryzm w epoce informacji, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2014

Internet sources:

1. 21st Century Statecraft, w: <http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm>
2. Mickiewicz Piotr, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Federacji Rosyjskiej w rozwiązaniach legislacyjnych i organizacyjnych, w: http://www.rocznikbezpieczenstwa.dsw.edu.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/wydawnictwo/RBM/RBM_artykuly/2011_8.pdf
3. Ogonowska Anna, Polityka informacyjna UE na progu XXI wieku, w: http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/3-2001_Ogonowska.pdf (access: 16.06.2017)
4. Prawda, kłamstwo, cenzura i autocenzura, w: „Problematyka militarna w wybranych zagranicznych środkach masowego przekazu”, nr. 3/97, Sztab Generalny Wojska Polskiego, Zarząd Rozpoznania i WRE
5. ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ БОРЬБА, w: <http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=9563@morfDictionary>
6. Stasiak-Jazukiewicz Ewa, Cele polityki medialnej UE, w: http://ec.europa.eu/polska/news/opinie/121129_cele_polityki_medialnej_ue_pl.htm (access: 16.06.2017)