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**Ideological and organizational changes in American  
peace movements on the eve of the Civil War.  
A study of Peter Brock's thought**

Abstract:

The author peruses Peter Brock's publication in a search for answers to the questions concerning ideological and organizational changes in American peace movements just before the Civil War. This venture shows the complexity of the terminology related to the impact of pacifist ideology on society. The article presents the evolution of the term 'pacifism' and the essential components consolidating the respective research area. Following Peter Brock's thinking the author presents pacifism in relation to religion, state, politics, abolitionism, use of force and war.

**Key words:** pacifism, Peter Brock, security studies, peace, religion, abolitionism, American Civil War

## Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present ideological and organizational transformations in American peace movements just before the Civil War, which were analysed and described by Peter Brock (1920–2006) over the years of his research activity.<sup>1</sup> The research process undertaken for the preparation of this text the source materials have been synthesized and analysed. The selection of sources – texts and authors – was determined, first, by the headline target: to present interdisciplinary reflection on creation of peace in its genetic relationship with the life of the society, which in its decisions relies on morality rooted in religion. Second, to refer to the works of one of the greatest researchers of pacifism – Peter Brock, whose texts may be recognised as an important and quantitatively voluminous part of the worldwide output in the area of research on pacifism. Third, to present a creative dialogue of research on security, peace, radicalism, and pacifism. The texts and views that are quoted and discussed – primarily those of Peter Brock, but also other researchers – have been selected from the viewpoint of their linkage with the securitological-pacifist-semantic problem area presented in this work. The paper consists of an introduction, four chapters analysing the works of the Canadian thinker, which in their subjects express the main lines of his research.

The narrative part is followed by the conclusions which reflect references to successively surfacing research topics, which are merely mentioned in the text below.

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<sup>1</sup> The research on the thoughts of Peter Brock cf.: Bado (2021): 147–166; Holmes (2017); Cortright (2008); Lynch (2007); Modzelewski (2000); Brock, Dyck (1996); Modzelewski (1995); Ziegler (1992).



## 1. Research issues

The analyses undertaken in this paper are covered by various studies on pacifism in its different meanings and diverse application.<sup>2</sup> The studies on ideological and organizational changes in the American peace movement on the eve of the Civil War include the analyses in which religion, anarchism, pluralism, violence, war and abolitionism constitute central concepts. Creating a synthetic record of the history of the thematic area that was of interest to him Peter Brock notes the main organizations of the American pacifist movement, namely: the Society of Friends<sup>3</sup>, the American Peace Society<sup>4</sup> and the New England Non-Resistance Society.<sup>5</sup> This means that the starting point should be the scrutiny and explication of the sources and factors which contributed to changes in individual directions of activity arising from the previously adopted system of values of the abovementioned groups. Despite the limited timeframe, which in this paper covers only the period immediately preceding the Civil War, it is appropriate – as Peter Brock pointed out – to refer to the 17<sup>th</sup> century, in which he saw the beginnings of the Society of Friends. The protagonist of the setting up of a new pacifist group was George Fox (1624–1691)– a cobbler from Leicestershire in Britain.<sup>6</sup> The founder of the sect (to be exact, Peter Brock repeatedly uses the term ‘sect’ when speaking about the Society of Friends) of the Quakers<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Smuniewski (2019): 341–357; Smuniewski, (2018): 75–93; Zięba (2003–2004): 8–13; Kellenberger (2018); Fiala (2020).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Allen, Moore (2018); Durham (2010); Dandelion (2008).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Whitney (1928).

<sup>5</sup> f. Brock (1991): 74–90.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Brock (1972): 256.

<sup>7</sup> Historically that name was of a pejorative, ridiculing nature. Cf. *Ibidem*: 255.

was characterised by great charisma and religious devotion. He started his efforts motivated by the need to re-invigorate Christianity around 1647, whereas the first recorded mentions concerning Quakerism are dated by Peter Brock to 1650.<sup>8</sup> In his ardent work George Fox strived at institutionalizing his informal actions. In consequence, in 1652 he founded the Society of Friends,<sup>9</sup> an organization affiliating people of the same religious denomination and with a hierarchical structure, as it was made up of local chapters united by the leadership body called the Meeting for Sufferings. This democratic model – as it was called by Peter Brock himself – was universally adopted among George Fox’s fellow believers in Britain and also – thanks to foreign missions – abroad.<sup>10</sup>

The early Quaker movement was generally treated as something ideologically located between Protestantism and Catholicism.<sup>11</sup> It was functioning on the basis of the spiritual experience acquired in the course of studying the New Testament and innate human morality.<sup>12</sup> The whole was interlocked in the term “Inward Light”,<sup>13</sup> which Peter Brock presents as follows: “According to Fox, this Inward Light, Christ’s spirit moving within men, was essential to illuminate God’s parallel revelation in Scripture. Armed with Spirit and the Book a Christian had no need for outward sacraments or a visible priesthood.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Brock (1990): 9.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Brock (1992a): 41.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Brock (1972): 255.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Brock, Young (1999): 7.

<sup>13</sup> Brock (1972).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.

The conviction that everyone led by “Inward Light”<sup>15</sup> can attain communion with God occupies the central place in the Quakers’ teachings and that is why – which seems worthy of special notice – the significance of the contents of the Bible was pushed down onto a lower level.<sup>16</sup> Passing to the gist of the behavioural model of the Society of Friends, Peter Brock points to the declaration which was published in 1661 by George Fox and his friends in order to demonstrate the position adopted by the Quakers.<sup>17</sup> The key message of that work was the categorical rejection of all form of war and violence, which are contrary to “Inward Light”.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, that disapproval had no moralistic or economic sources.<sup>19</sup> The Quakers were also involved in the analysis of the sources of war as they claimed that constant strivings at the escalation of conflicts serve only the improvement of the material situation of concrete individuals as well as elevation of national pride or the glory of a state.<sup>20</sup> A specific and at the same time the only form of struggle in which a righteous Quaker should take part should be the one revealing itself in the conflict between good and evil, where denunciation of violence is tantamount to goodness. According to Peter Brock, the Quakers called this type of spiritual struggle “the Lamb’s War”.<sup>21</sup>

So presented pacifist model of the Society of Friends started to spread throughout Britain. A fast growth of the number of followers resulted in the transfer of the sect to the other

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<sup>15</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Brock (1992): 41.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Ibidem: 42.

<sup>18</sup> Brock (1972): 256.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Ibidem: 269.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Brock (1994): 29.

<sup>21</sup> Brock (1992): 41.

side of the Atlantic in 1656, where the field for cultivating the innovative ideology both on the North American continent as well as the nearby Caribbean islands seemed to be very fertile.<sup>22</sup>

Let us thus have a look at what Peter Brock wrote about the Quakers in the 19<sup>th</sup>-century North America. For years of their activity they kept on bearing witness to peace consisting in the rejection of violence and war motivated by religious reasons.<sup>23</sup> However, the surfacing of new liberal trends in theology somewhat alleviated their discipline. Many features which had distinguished the Society of Friends as a sect, such as their peculiar attire or the restriction consisting in choosing a spouse only and exclusively from among the fellow believers, were lost.<sup>24</sup> Peter Brock states that at the time the Quakers were short of the spark of life, their creativity and dynamism were waning.<sup>25</sup> As a result, the American peace scene gained more room to fit in newly formed groups of a similar foundation of activity but with a somewhat broader horizons and spiritual thought.

The main representative of the peace thought current was the Massachusetts Peace Society founded in 1815 by Noah Worcester (1758–1837) in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. Dynamic social changes resulted in the expansion of the association into the American Peace Society set up in 1828 under the leadership of William Ladd (1778–1841). From its very beginning the Society focused its efforts on counter-acting aggressive mentality, promotion of pro-war slogans and on looking for functional alternatives to war; they opted,

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. Brock (1972): 256.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Brock (1992a): 57.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Brock (1972): 331.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Brock (1992a): 57.

inter alia, for the establishment of a congress of nations and international arbitration. Peter Brock notices certain correlations between the totally independent American Peace Society and the Quakers. There is actually a certain debt of gratitude shown to the Society of Friends for their perseverance in their peace quest. Members of the American Peace Society readily made use of George Fox's and William Penn's publications (1644–1718)<sup>26</sup> and periodicals brought out by the Quakers. Moreover, with great satisfaction they referred to the Quaker experiment in Pennsylvania,<sup>27</sup> which will be further expounded on later. The object of contention lies only in the collective of the American Peace Society, since membership was not restricted exclusively to zealous Christians pacifists as in the case of the Society of Friends. The Quakers saw this as a serious obstacle on the path to cooperation.<sup>28</sup> The successive changes that took place in the 19<sup>th</sup> century crated a new area for the peace group to get involved in. Namely, it was the movement aimed at the emancipation of slaves, which was called abolitionism. The ever more festering problem of slavery provided a pretext for radical pacifists, as Peter Brock calls them, who, apart from their fanaticism about the emancipation of black inhabitants of the North American continent, neither shared the conservative stance of the American Peace Society and the Society of Friends as to the affirmation of state and taking an active part in its functioning. Thus a new organization was formed.<sup>29</sup> In 1838, there was a schism within the American Peace

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. Beatty (1939).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Sharpless (2002).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Brock (1965): 68–69.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 594–595.

Society.<sup>30</sup> According to what Peter Brock claims, a group of radical pacifists under the leadership of William Lloyd Garrison (1805–1879) set up its own association in Boston called the New England Non-Resistance Society. The constitutive document laying down the grounds for the functioning of the organization was the Declaration of Sentiments compiled by Garrison.<sup>31</sup> The document outlined a plan of a campaign against war, violence, slavery and civil government.<sup>32</sup> Member of the New England Non-Resistance Society formed a kind of an abolitionist elite. Their ranks included left-wing abolitionist activists and individuals who had left the American Peace Society.<sup>33</sup> As noted by Peter Brock, that group of radical pacifists entrusted a great organizational to women, which was something very novel and at the same time shocking even for liberal William Ladd.<sup>34</sup>

## 2. Rationalism

One of the features of ideological and organizational changes in American peace movements just before the Civil War singled out by Peter Brock was rationalism. The beginnings of this phenomenon should be sought in the Society of Friends. Following the activities of the Quakers at that time their unyielding attachment to the New Testament is noticeable. To confirm such a state of affairs Peter Brock quotes one of the texts published by the local association of the Philadelphia Quakers: „«Our testimony against all war

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 63.

<sup>31</sup> Brock (1992): 69.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Brock (1992a): 50.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Brock (1992): 69.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 64.

and fighting» it states, «is founded on the precious precepts contained in the New Testament and the immediate openings made on the mind by the same Spirit which dictated it».<sup>35</sup> The Quaker faith, involving refusal to do military service as well as objection to all kinds of war, continued to be officially supported by the Society as a whole, while discipline was strictly enforced.<sup>36</sup> Because of the longstanding static in the Quaker ideology, members of the Society spared no effort to arouse their pacifist in order to improve their bearing witness of peace.

The emerging thoughts associated with rationalism were the quests for new possibilities of development which could have a positive impact on the Society of Friends' condition. According to Peter Brock, worth noticing is a British Quaker Jonathan Dymond (1796–1828) and his essay on war, which exerted an exceptional impact on the reflections of American pacifists throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>37</sup> In his work, Dymond with an equal frequency invokes the Holy Scripture, human reason and practical morality.<sup>38</sup> The narration of the essay on war was aimed primarily at revealing the inconsistency of war with human reason and morality as well as presenting the utilitarian aspect of pacifism. Dymond was a devoted advocate of cooperation with people from without the pacifist sects who opted for the cause of peace. This pragmatic idea was aimed at eliminating the existing divisions in order to optimise the effects addressed to the omnipresent dissemination of the concept of warless world.<sup>39</sup> The pacifist

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<sup>35</sup> Brock (1968): 713–714.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*: 337.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Brock (1970): 260.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Brock (1972): 340.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Brock (1990): 258.

rules, which he derived from the New Testament as well as the reasonable mind, had the same application in individual relationships as well as interstate relations.<sup>40</sup> As noted by Peter Brock, it was something new, far-flung from the position of the early Quakers, which additionally aroused the interest of the then believers. Dymond was undoubtedly an adherent of the pacifist attachment to Jesus's Sermon on the Mount as well as other fragments of the New Testament, but as regards their explication his approach assumed no literal interpretation of those texts.<sup>41</sup>

Intensified rationalism put in place of religion, taking into account the earlier mentioned organization, was advocated by William Lloyd Garrison. According to Peterem Brockiem, Garrison strived at liberating the pacifist faith from overdependence on the biblical authority. The founder of the New England Non-Resistance Society revealed a considerable knowledge of the Bible since childhood, but gradually he felt that it also may create despotism in the mind and prevent a growth of religiousness in human hearts as effectively as it was done by Orthodox Churches he was an ardent opponent of with a view to their loss of real Christian virtue.<sup>42</sup> The ideology of non-violence proclaimed by Garrison was based on the interpretation of Christian Gospels with an assumption that their contents would be approved by human conscience.<sup>43</sup> As underlined by Peter Brock, the position of the New England Non-Resistance Society united the law of Christ's love contained in the scriptures as well as in the spirit of His teaching with inviolability of human

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Brock (1972): 340.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Ibidem: 341–342.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 588–589.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Brock (1968a): 143.



live in all circumstances.<sup>44</sup> In other words, the leader of radical pacifists made use of his knowledge of the Bible rationally without trying to treat it as an ideal work at any cost and at the same time avoiding the use of apology of those fragments which were not close to his convictions and ideas. Garrison wished for empirical pacifism, which would be argued with human conscience and reason rather than because of a divine mission.<sup>45</sup> Strong attachment to the abolitionist cause was a cause of a permanent evolution of the pacifist concept of the New England Non-Resistance Society's leader. Eventually, Garrison obviously recognised that the source of pacifist convictions could in no way be associated with the teachings of Jesus but with human soul and innate morality of man, which could sustain that condition notwithstanding the Christian faith. Peter Brock calls such a sharp world-outlook change an ethical impulse.<sup>46</sup> Summing up, pacifism disseminated by William Lloyd Garrison was focused on the Bible and at the same time – paradoxically – detached from it. As Peter Brock recalls, *The Declaration of Sentiments*,<sup>47</sup> published by the New England Non-Resistance Society and constituting the core of its functioning, exposed their Christian and anarchist position.<sup>48</sup> Garrison's further life illustrates his gradual departure from the ideas rooted in Christianity, in place of which he ever more clearly referred to rationalism. It was rationalism that became a central idea for his own actions as well as the efforts undertaken by the Society that was dependent on him.

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 591.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*: 588–589.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Brock (1968a): 143.

<sup>47</sup> Brock (1992): 69.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*: 69–70.

### 3. Abolitionism

Before the beginning of the Civil War, the abolitionist idea predominated mainly in the thoughts of the New England Non-Resistance group's members. As Peter Brock recalls, it was one of the main causes which determined the establishment of that organization in 1838. William Lloyd Garrison clearly distinguished the abolitionist movement, with which he identified himself most, from others, though which proclaimed women's rights or objection against violence. As Peter Brock has noted, Garrison also failed to notice inconsistencies in the other initiatives that have been mentioned above.<sup>49</sup> Looking at the then situation of the Quakers and their activities throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, one may not but notice their involvement in the efforts aimed at the emancipation of slaves. Peter Brock states that generally as a whole the Quakers supported the activities of abolitionists.<sup>50</sup> The witness of the Society of Friends against slavery was so designed as not to clash with their thinking about peace. They backed the striving at eliminating this specific manner of arbitrary subjugation usually by using persuasion<sup>51</sup> and to a certain degree were covert abolitionists.<sup>52</sup> Despite similar ideas as to the above discussed issues, the organizations were not at all friendly to each other. The Quakers working for the New England Non-Resistance Society were reviled<sup>53</sup> and subjected to disciplinary actions by local chapters of the Society of Friends, notwithstanding their peaceful

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. Brock (1994): 43.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Ibidem: 41.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 714.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Brock (1992): 58.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Brock (1965): 75.

intentions.<sup>54</sup> As an object of contention between the two groups Peter Brock point to the impulsive tactics of the New England Non-Resistance Society, which was saturated with sharp statements, whereas the Quakers followed modest and quiet methods for the implementation of their goals. This dichotomy made it difficult to find a common platform between those organizations.<sup>55</sup> It should be noted that the Quakers' ambivalence as regards the cause of the emancipation of slaves and their hostility towards the New England Non-Resistance Society by no means weakened radical pacifists in their mission.

Initially the idea of abolitionism promoted by Garrison was based on the refusal to use physical force in order to realise his aspirations to free the slaves. As Peter Brock has noted, despite the views bordering on ultracism with respect to the abolitionist issue the New England Non-Resistance Society continued to regard itself as a strictly pacifist body, which obliged them to investigate the peaceful means for resolving the problem that were not against the Declaration of Sentiments.<sup>56</sup> To confirm the earlier mentioned position Peter Brock quotes the words of the leader of the New England Non-Resistance Society: "forbid the doing of evil that good may come"<sup>57</sup> and "the abolition of slavery by the spirit of repentance."<sup>58</sup>

The prosaic abolitionist activities of the New England Non-Resistance Society so far based primarily on persuasion and anti-slavery agitation were intensified in the forties and

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<sup>54</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 60.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Brock (1992a): 55.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 610.

<sup>57</sup> Brock (1968a): 164.

<sup>58</sup> Brock (1968): 610.

fifties of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As Peter Brock points out, in 1850 the Fugitive Slave Law forced the American northern state to return the slave who had managed to escape from their holders in the South.<sup>59</sup> In response to the attempts of implementing the new initiative radical abolitionists, invoking the law which they considered supreme in relation to the one created by man, started a series of rescue operations for the oppressed slaves. The situation became dynamic and many people who joined the undertaking were ready to use force if necessary in order to carry out the anti-slavery plans.<sup>60</sup> One of close co-workers of Garrison, C.K. Whipple (1808–1900), seeing the growing aggression between the conflicted parties, undertook to halt the tendency aiming at losing the pacifist position and formulated an appeal to his friends from the New England Non-Resistance Society. Whipple invoked the ethics of non-violence consistent with the teaching of Christ.<sup>61</sup> Pointing to C.K. Whipple Peter Brock notes his attitude called for by the abolitionist: “God’s arrangement for mankind is that wrongdoing should breed self-reproach, and that thus should tend to confession and amendment.”<sup>62</sup> Undoubtedly, the perceptible aversion to aggression indicates a call for improvement consistent with the model of a righteous Christian who uses only love as an instrument to implement his plans. Wishing to attain the omnipresent emancipation of slaves without unnecessary bloodshed, Whipple outlined the following plan of action. He spoke for the passive collective resistance. The plan provided for a significant intervention of abolitionists who would cooperate by offering

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<sup>59</sup> Cf. Brock (1992): 71.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 67.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 610–611.

<sup>62</sup> Brock (1968a): 165.

shelter for the oppressed. Shelters would be located in hard to reach places, such as highlands and mountains. The final effect of this operation would be capitulation of slave holders due to the losses of manpower which was the main driver of their operations.<sup>63</sup> As Peter Brock has noted it was the first program of civil disobedience in the history pacifism – which should be specifically underlined with a view to the history of that idea – similar to later assumptions of Gandhi's philosophy (1869–1948). Eventually it was only submitted in paper form and was not implemented by Garrison's comrades.<sup>64</sup>

Abolitionism was identical for both the Society of Friends and the New England Non-Resistance Society, but the difference in the area of implementing the common goal totally destroyed the possibilities of their cooperation. Abolitionism was a new ideological current, which was received by the Quakers with reserve. Despite the fact that their development in this direction was not as dynamic as in Garrison's organisation, during the outbreak of the Civil War, which brought about many ethical dilemmas for them, some Quakers decided to abandon pacifism and get involved in the fight for the emancipation of slaves.<sup>65</sup>

#### 4. Anarchism

The reflection on rationalism and abolitionism leads to the consideration of anarchism. In order to elucidate Peter Brock's views concerning anarchism it should be noted that ideological changes in the American peace movement occupy an unprecedented place in their Christian approach

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 611–612.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 67.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Brock (1990): 163.

to the issue of state. On the one hand, the Society of Friends which dated back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century and generally sympathised with pluralism, and on the other - the New England Non-Resistance Society which was set up in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and propagated anarchism. The issue of attitude to state matters as well as politics constitute a bone of contention between the two groups,<sup>66</sup> the result of which was no cooperation that would be predisposed to improve the weakening 19<sup>th</sup>-century American peace movement.<sup>67</sup>

The antagonistic approach to the issue of anarchism and at the same time affirmation of the positive aspects of the government were frequently presented in formal statements of local chapters of the Society of Friends. The involvement of the Quakers in politics was not condemned if no visible relation of their work with the military sector was found.<sup>68</sup> This statement is confirmed, among other things, by the experience from Pennsylvania, where the Quakers held the reins of power in the unarmed province for about seven decades.<sup>69</sup> Despite the intensifying quietist trend and disappointment with the world of politics after the loss of considerable influence in Pennsylvania, the world view of the Quakers in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was still closer to the approval of government. A large number of people who identified themselves with Quakerism opposed the intention of their slow withdrawal from cooperation with government<sup>70</sup> and took an active part in election, both on the local and federal level.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Cf. Brock (1992a): 53.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*: 57.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Brock (1965): 73.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 31.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Brock (1972): 338.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Brock (1965): 72.

Despite the favourable attitude of the Society of Friends to the advantages flowing from the state, there was a contrast as regards their attitude to the issue of paying taxes. The reluctance effected mainly from the conviction that the levies paid by the Quakers would be used for military purposes. The multitude of the difference of opinion in the Society of Friends resulted in having worked out no uniform position in this area. Peter Brock notes that many Quakers were ready to go to prison so as not to burden their conscience, but there was also a group which while paying taxes at the same time formed an alternative for military service. Both attitudes were acceptable to the Society of Friends.<sup>72</sup>

The New England Non-Resistance Society assumed an anarchist position. The intensity of William Lloyd Garrison's hatred against war and slavery led him to condemn the institution of government which – as it follows from the analysis of Peter Brock's texts – nurtured both. The leader of radical abolitionists regarded all contemporary governments as evil, and that is why if a Christian has any respect for his professed religion he should refrain from political activities.<sup>73</sup> To confirm this state of affairs Peter Brock invokes the views professed by Garrison, who maintained that: "We cannot acknowledge allegiance to any human government."<sup>74</sup> In the Declaration of Sentiments,<sup>75</sup> which was adopted in 1838, members of the New England Non-Resistance Society defined their position calling themselves Christian anarchists<sup>76</sup> and supported that view with several arguments

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<sup>72</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 352–353.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Brock (1992): 69.

<sup>74</sup> Brock (1998): 65.

<sup>75</sup> Brock (1992): 69.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 65.

the most important of which emphasized that the state was infiltrated by the spirit of violence and warfare.<sup>77</sup> Garrison's organization also undertook to refrain from voting in elections and holding any positions in government.<sup>78</sup> This exposed their position adopted in the constitutive document, which contain an eloquent statement with the characteristics of a propaganda slogan: "A bullet is in every ballot."<sup>79</sup> The Society also condemned the entire legal system with its penalties and prisons considering it to be unchristian.<sup>80</sup> What is interesting, despite the general disapproval of government Garrison's organization conscientiously paid taxes.<sup>81</sup> The refused to pay only those levies which were openly used for war operations.<sup>82</sup> As an alternative to a state they proposed a voluntary association of people living in accordance with the ethical code of the Gospel, the rules of which would be used to control demoralised people.<sup>83</sup> Christian anarchism rather than simply anarchy was an ideal for the New England Non-Resistance Society.<sup>84</sup>

## 5. Implications

The history of ideological and organizational changes on the North American continent before the Civil War is characterised by considerable dynamics stimulated by new social ideas marked by liberalism, moralism, and rationalism,

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<sup>77</sup> Cf. Brock (1965): 71.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 65.

<sup>79</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Ibidem: 65–66.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 600.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Brock (1992): 70.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Brock (1968a): 152.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Ibidem: 144.



as well as a totally new problem faced by the American peace movement - abolitionism. Omnipresent tolerance also bore fruit in the form of new societies which rejected the historical rigorously sectarian methods of action and affiliated all those who opted for the cause of peace. In consequence, it initiated a current of departure from tradition, in which pacifism was argued by motivation arising straight from the New Testament, which is particularly visible in the position and statements of William Lloyd Garrison. In many cases Christianity remained only nominal. The greatest dilemma in the life of an American promoter of peace was his attitude to the cause of the emancipation of slaves. They realised that the probability of resolving that conflict without resorting to physical force was close to nil. The events of 1850 associated with the Fugitive Slave Law – described above as part of the reflection on abolitionism – resulted in the waiver of the pacifist attitude by a considerable number of followers of that movement. It was also the time in history which formed the foundations for the program of civil disobedience cultivated later by Mahatma Ghandi.<sup>85</sup> There was an agreement within the American peace movement as to the negation of slavery, though when it came to considering the details of concrete actions and their forms the problem started to be contentious. One of such details was the attitude to state and politics. The Quakers frequently invoked their history in Pennsylvania, where for almost seven decades they had been in power despite being unarmed<sup>86</sup> and they approved of the existence of government. On the other side there were the followers of Garrison, who enthusiastically propagated

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<sup>85</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 67.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Ibidem: 31.

the slogans against the state, which in their opinion was responsible for wars, violence as well as slavery. As Peter Brock emphasized, worth noting is the legacy left behind by the New England Non-Resistance Society, which later reassured the great Russian thinker Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) in his pacifist attitude.<sup>87</sup> The end of the formal activity of William Lloyd Garrison's organization dates back to the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>88</sup> This means the abolitionists did not pass the test of time, did not survive until such a great occurrence as the Civil War. That conflict brought about many complications. Those left their mark to a considerable degree on the functioning of the Society of Friends. The hard times the Quakers had to face made many of them renounce their pacifist faith.<sup>89</sup> The Civil War period marks a culmination of ideological and organizational changes of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the same time - as Peter Brock underlines – one of the greatest dilemmas in history to be faced by pacifists.<sup>90</sup>

### Conclusion

The presented reflection on ideological and organizational changes in American peace movements just before the Civil War as seen by Peter Brock warrants a fundamental statement. Historical event, such as war, verify sectarian beliefs and ideologies the sources of which are the views of individual people – even if those people are charismatic leaders. Thinking about the functioning of nations and states as well

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<sup>87</sup> Cf. Brock (1968): 615.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Brock (1988): 67.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Brock (1990): 163.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Brock (1998): 74–75.

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as the processes of creating security, religious entities which cut themselves off the community building processes should be subject to constant observation. It is their force of exerting influence on individuals and the level of social security that should be watched. The experience of the tragedy of many people captivated by sects is an important argument in favour of setting up in states some methods of observing new religious movements, especially when they declare their anti-state attitudes and objection against the army and military service. The axiological systems, structures and manifestos of emerging religious groups should become a subject of research not only for scholars of religion or theologians but also securitologists.

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## **The shaping of Abkhazian statehood in the post-revolution period 1917–1931**

### **Abstract**

The paper is aimed to show social and political changes taking place in the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia and the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the post-revolution period until its reabsorption by the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and the death of the merited Abkhazian communist Nestor Lakoba, as well as to outline the process of formation of Abkhazian statehood. The analysis of sources and papers seen from the viewpoint of various sciences – history, politology, security and cultural studies - was employed as the research method. The results have been put through a synthesis and induction. An erudite approach has been adopted – when discussing a given topic the recognized facts and views of observers and researchers are quoted so that their clash and confrontation could be used to expand the research field and formulate conclusions that may prove useful in research on the shaping of statehood of various political communities.

**Key words:** Abkhazia, USSR, Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia, Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Sukhumi, Sukhum, Georgian SSR, Lakoba, Stalin, Beria, Caucasus, SRR Abchazia, Abkhaz ASRR, Tiflis, Tbilisi

## Introduction

The overthrow of Tsar Nikolai II Romanov and taking over power by the Bolsheviks open up an opportunity for many nations inhabiting the Russian Empire to create their own statehood. After a long period of slavery many nations, e.g. Poles, or the people who never had an opportunity to establish their own sovereign state, e.g. Latvians, Lithuanian, or Estonians, took advantage of the world political situation and post-war chaos to create independent state. The independence moods were equally strong in a small Caucasian nation which, like Poland, had been repeatedly stigmatised, subject to tough repressions and attempts to deprive it from its national culture, language, values and national awareness. The Abkhaz people tried to take advantage of the collapse of Tsardom like many other nations inhabiting the Southern Caucasus. For example Georgians – the eternal enemy of Abkhazians – initially created an artificial national entity together with Azeris and Armenians called the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic which did not pass the test of time and after several months each of those three nations formed a separate state organism. Following a difficult period of *muhajirstvo*, forced georgianisation and russification as well as numerous relocations to various parts of Russia and Mingrelian settlement of indigenous Abkhazian lands, the Abkhazian nation stood the opportunity to mark their own statehood on the world map and become independent from Russians and Georgians. Unfortunately, as a result of a deceit, in less than three years Abkhazia found itself again in the Georgian sphere of influence, which left behind a significant imprint. Did the communist ideas carried by the Bolsheviks and the Red Army rightly proved to be a salvation for the Abkhazian nation



so painfully hit by history? Probably not, though if the initial Lenin's plans were properly continued by Stalin and his closest advisers numerous antagonisms and hatred between Georgians and Abkhazians could have been prevented.

### **The fall of the Russian Empire and a brief period of *apparent* autonomy within the Democratic Republic of Georgia**

The time before Abkhazia was entirely incorporated into the USSR is described by Abkhazian historians as the interim period.<sup>1</sup> After the February 1917 Revolution the provisional government set up the Special Transcaucasian Committee. A meeting of representatives of the Sukhumi district took place on 10 March 1917 in Sukhumi, as a result of which a local interim authority was set up in Abkhazia under the leadership of Prince Alexander Shervashidze<sup>2</sup> and the militia headed by Prince Tatash Marshania was established.<sup>3</sup> A union agreement was signed on 20 October 1917 in the capital of North Ossetia Vladikavkaz<sup>4</sup> upon the initiative of Caucasian nations, one of the signatories of which was also the Abkhazian delegation. The alliance including Cossack soldiers, Caucasian mountaineers and steppe peoples was later transformed into a more formalized entity called the South-East Alliance. Each of the signatories was guaranteed equal rights and full

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<sup>1</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 131–132.

<sup>2</sup> Rus. Александр Константинович Шервашидзе; See more: Чиковани (2007): 46–47.

<sup>3</sup> Rus. Таташ Маршания. See also: Лакоба (2017), URL = <https://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/Abkhazia/20170227/1020484806/lakoba-fevral-skaya-revolyuciya-1917-goda-dala-abkazi-gosudarstvennost.html>, [access: 28.01.2020].

<sup>4</sup> The capital of North Ossetia located within the borders of the Russian Federation, a large industrial centre at the foot of the Caucasus.

independence. The alliance comprised also the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, a quasi-state, one of the members of which was also Abkhazia.<sup>5</sup>

According to Stanislav Lakoba and Oleg Bgazba an important moment from the viewpoint of Abkhazian statehood was the establishment of the Abkhaz National Council on 8 November 1917. The entity was considered to be a local authority within the framework of the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus and it was headed by Simon Basaria.<sup>6</sup> As written by Rafał Czachor, the Abkhaz National Council adopted the Declaration of the Abkhaz Nation and the Constitution of the Abkhaz National Council, which articulated the right to self-determination as well as maintaining and nurturing own traditions and customs.<sup>7</sup> Invited to the meeting was also a Georgian delegation headed by social-democrat Akaki Chenkeli.<sup>8</sup> Totally taken by surprise by the ensuing situation the Georgian delegate spared no effort to thwart the independence plans of the Abkhazians. However, he failed to dissuade the Abkhazians from establishing an alliance with

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<sup>5</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 132.

<sup>6</sup> Rus. Симон Басария (1884–1942)– Abkhazian social and political activist, teacher, researcher of local culture, writer, expert in geography, ethnography and economy. Correspondent of the Petersburg Academy of Sciences. In his life he made a lot of foreign trips, among others to: Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, North Africa, Italy, Germany and Turkey, where he talked to the Abkhazian diaspora. More on this subject: Басария (1923).

<sup>7</sup> Czachor (2014): 105.

<sup>8</sup> Rus. Акакий Чхенкели (1874–1959)– Georgian Menshevik, politician, diplomat and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the government of Noe Ramishvili (April–November 1918). After the Red Army entered the Democratic Republic of Georgia, he was forced to emigrate and stayed abroad until death. He dies in Paris. More on this subject: Lityński (2018): 109–130; Materski (2010): 65–111.

the mountain nations of the Caucasus, which by the way did not last long. The influence of various political factions led to the change of an ally; according to historians, the culminating moment was the takeover of power by the Bolsheviks led by Nestor Lakoba.<sup>9</sup> The appearance of a new player on the political arena forces some Abkhazian activists to conclude an agreement with Georgia. To this end, equipped with the authorization of the Abkhaz National Council the official Abkhazian delegation headed by Razhden Ivanovich Kakuba<sup>10</sup> went to Tiflis – Tbilisi to strike an agreement with the Georgians.<sup>11</sup> As a result of intended measures the delegation was notoriously misled as to a planned Turkish attack against Abkhazia and a secret agreement concluded in Istanbul between Germany and Turkey in consequence of which the Abkhazian land was to be incorporated into the German sphere of influence. The deliberate disinformation quickly brought about the intended results. Fearing foreign intervention the head of the delegation himself assumed all responsibility and without consulting the Abkhaz National Council on 8 June 1918 an agreement was signed between Abkhazia and independent Georgia. The treaty was formulated in 8 points:

- a) The concluded agreement shall be reviewed by the National Assembly of Abkhazia which shall finally define

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<sup>9</sup> Janicki (2009): 156. A similar position is presented by: Бражба, Лакоба (2007): 132.

<sup>10</sup> Rus. Какуба Ражден Иванович (1873–1941) – Representative of the first generation of the technical intelligentsia of Abkhazia (railway engineer). Known for his charitable activities. After the annexation of Georgia and Abkhazia by the USSR he withdrew from political life. Victim of Stalinist repressions. He spent the last years of his life in a death cell.

<sup>11</sup> Шамба, Непрошин (2004) URL = [http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib\\_sh/shamba00.php](http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_sh/shamba00.php), [access; 29.01.2020].

- the political structure of Abkhazia as well as its relations with Georgia;
- b) A plenipotentiary representative of the Abkhazian National Council shall be functioning at the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia with whom the Georgian government will be consulting the affairs of Abkhazia;
  - c) The internal affairs of Abkhazia will be dealt with by the Abkhazian National Council;
  - d) In foreign policy matters Georgia shall be playing the role of an official representative of both sides, actually representing the country together with Abkhazia;
  - e) Loans and funds needed for the administration of Abkhazia shall be allocated from the funds of the Democratic Republic of Georgia which shall be put at the disposal of the Abkhazian National Council;
  - f) In order to quickly establish the revolutionary order and organize tough power, the Democratic Republic of Georgia shall dispatch a unit of the Red Guards to help the Abkhazian National Council and to be at its disposal;
  - g) In Abkhazia, the Abkhazian National Council shall organize military units, while the necessary equipment, uniforms and funds shall be allocated by the Democratic Republic of Georgia to the disposal of the Council;
  - h) Social reforms shall be carried out by the Abkhazian National Council under the general regulations passed by the Transcaucasian Sejm in accordance with the local conditions.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 139. More on this subject: Шамба, Непрошин (2004).

According to Kamil Janicki, the signing of the treaty was associated with the loss of political importance by Abkhazia. Shortly after the document had been ratified, Georgian troops backed by German units entered Abkhazia thus showing its domination. Historian and political scientists consider the broad autonomy guaranteed by the treaty is considered to be just a smokescreen. According to the preserved accounts, even the political representative of Georgia to Abkhazia, social-democrat Isidor Ramishvili<sup>13</sup> did not believe in the political independence Abkhazia received from Georgia. Along the strengthening of the Georgian position in the Abkhaz territory the level of liberties was restricted. As follows from a review of literature and what is reported by Kamil Janicki in the publication entitled *Źródła Nienawiści [Sources of Hatred]* the Georgian began *georgianization* with a fight against the national language. Abkhazian was denied the status of an official language, while children at school were instructed exclusively in Georgian. The authorities in Tiflis even saw to changing fonts in all typewriters. The use of any language other than the official one was strictly forbidden. Also the issue of mass-scale resettlements of the Georgian population to the Abkhazian territories should not be overlooked. The inhabitants of borderland areas were purposefully ascribed a different nationality, while the Turks who sympathised with communism were repressed. The authorities also waged a large-scale propaganda campaign belittling

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<sup>13</sup> Rus. Исидор Рамишвили (1859–1937) – Georgian Menshevik; during the functioning of the Democratic Republic of Georgia member of the government in the years 1919–1921. After the annexation of Georgia, he was several times arrested. He spent the last years of his life in exile. See also: Vakhtangishvili, Simashvili (2014): 1450.

the historical role of Abkhazia.<sup>14</sup> The Abkhazian National Council, mentioned in the eight-point treaty and constituting a form of a local parliament, was dissolved because of apparently pro-Turk leanings. The new members were mostly Georgians and other nationalities, while the Abkhazians lost their position. As noted by the Abkhazian historians, Stanislav Lakoba and Oleg Bgaghba, the measures introduced by the authorities in Tiflis were not even supported by the local Georgian population – mostly Mingrellian.<sup>15</sup>

The three-year period of the Georgian authority over Abkhazia is assessed by Abkhazian historian as the time of civil war and occupation. Until today, the Abkhazians have been holding a grudge against the Georgians for lies and deceit they were guilty of by not keeping the terms of the treaty. Two times, namely on 15 August and 10 October 1918, the authorities in Tiflis tried to forcefully block the legitimate body of local authority, that is the Abkhazian National Council. It is not only the Abkhazian historians that present a negative view of the 1918–1921 period.<sup>16</sup> An English journalist, writer and lawyer, Carl Eric Bechhofer Roberts, in his publication entitled *In Denikin's Russia and The Caucasus*, describes the Georgians as a classical example of a small imperialist nation with regard to grabbing the land outside of their borders.<sup>17</sup>

Summing up the hitherto discussion it may be stated that the aggressive and nationalistic policy of Georgia caused enormous social discontent, not only among the Abkhazians.

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<sup>14</sup> Janicki (2009):158–159. A similar position is presented by: Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 140–142.

<sup>15</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 152.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem:153. More on this subject: Шамба, Непрошин (2004).

<sup>17</sup> Roberts (1971): 14.

Repressed were also the Russians, Armenians and Greeks. In the opinion of Abkhazian historians, the behaviour presented by the Georgian for three years caused that other peoples living in Georgia awaited the Red Army as a liberator from tyranny.<sup>18</sup> Comparing the political moods in Abkhazia at the time of signing the treaty with Georgia in 1918 and in 1921 Rafał Czachor draws very interesting conclusions. While in 1918 the communist sentiments in the Abkhazian society had not been very frequent, after three years the situation dramatically changed. The attitude of Abkhazian Bolsheviks also assumed a totally different format. They started to promote independence ideas and tried to look for support from former members of the Abkhazian National Council promising them the reconstruction of their own independent statehood in the form of a separate Soviet Republic.<sup>19</sup>

### **The period after the fall of the Democratic Republic of Georgia**

The brief period of Georgian statehood ended upon the entering of the Red Army. The indigenous inhabitants of Abkhazia saw the approach of the army as the beginning of the new stage of their statehood. On 31 March 1921, Abkhazia was granted the status of a Soviet Republic that is the highest possible form of autonomy possible within the USSR, though the Soviet authority was established somewhat earlier, on 4 March 1921. On the day the troops of the Abkhazian Insurgent Army with the assistance of the 9<sup>th</sup> Red Army captured Sukhumi. Historians consider 31 March 1921 as the date which finally sealed the fate of Abkhazia since the Abkhazian

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<sup>18</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 153. More on this subject: Шамба, Непрошин (2004).

<sup>19</sup> Czachor (2014): 107.

military command, in this case the Revolutionary Committee informed other Soviet Republics and the most important person in the state – Lenin, who was responsible for the final decision, about the establishment of a new Soviet Republic. Abkhazian politician faced the challenge of organizing central and local structures from scratch, as well and reconstructing destroyed national economy.<sup>20</sup>

Many historians and political scientists believe that the granting of such a high status (republic) in the state was incomprehensible. As compared with other Soviet Republics Abkhazia was very small, and what is more – the percentage of the native Abkhazians was smaller than the Georgians.<sup>21</sup> Therefore a question arises what had that small state done to deserve this? According to Kamil Janicki, the Bolsheviks wanted to reward the Abkhazians for their effort and support for the revolution. The historian sees a hidden agenda in this case. The newly established republic could be an ideal example of the policy of “rootinization”, the is the return to the roots, which was implemented at that time. With its own language, alphabet, culture, history and the political base Abkhazia was a textbook example for the multinational Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup>

The autonomy and the possibility to exercise self-determination obtained from the leader of the revolution<sup>23</sup> did not last long. Over one month after the proclamation of the new republic, on 5 July 1921, there was a plenary conference

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<sup>20</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 153. More on this subject: Шамба, Непрошин (2004), Прицкер (1981): 5.

<sup>21</sup> Шанава (2015): 6–32. A similar position is presented by: Janicki (2009): 161; Materski (2010): 121.

<sup>22</sup> Janicki (2009): 160–162. More on this subject: Fedorowicz (2015): 174.

<sup>23</sup> Vladimir Il'yich Ulyanov / Rus. Владимир Ильич Ульянов / Lenin.



of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee attended by Stalin, who during the meeting pressed for depriving Abkhazia of the status of a Soviet Republic and incorporating it in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic as an autonomy. The plans were not so quickly brought into effect and according to Abkhazian historians the time from gaining the highest position in the USSR to 17 February 1922 was a unique time in the history of Abkhazia. In fact, the newly established Republic was dependent neither on the central authority nor the Georgia SSR.<sup>24</sup> The slow process of absorption of Abkhazia by Georgia began on 12 February 1922 when the first congress of Abkhazian communists was organized.<sup>25</sup> According to Stanislav Lakoba and Oleg Bgaghba a large pressure on the majority of decisions adopted during the talks was exerted by Stalin and the Georgian communist Sergo Ordzhonikidze.<sup>26</sup> Also a special agreement between Georgia and

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<sup>24</sup> Materski (2010): 131–133. More on this subject: Furier (2000): 108–109; Świątochowski (2006): 117.

<sup>25</sup> In this place it is worth noting a popular science publication: Салакая (2017), URL = <https://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/Abkhazia/20170212/1020402862/pervyj-sezd-sovetov-abkaxii-unikalnyj-status-i-zemelnaya-reforma.html>, [access: 1.02.2020].

<sup>26</sup> Actually Rus. Григорий Константинович Орджоникидзе (1886–1937) - prominent Soviet party and state activist of Georgian origin. Born in a landowner's family he attended a paramedic school in Tiflis. In 1903, he joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and two years later took part in the 1905 revolution. Arrested (on suspicion of arms smuggling), after release went to Germany. Upon return he settled in Baku, where he was a co-worker of Stalin. From 1930 a member of the Political Bureau, and from 1932 Commissar of Heavy Industry. He dies on 18 February, according to the (then) official version of a heart attack. At the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev revealed that Ordzhonikidze had been forced to commit suicide. More on this subject: Materski (2010): 130–133; Pipes (2005): 170–172; Кузина, URL = <http://rostov-region.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000023/st023.shtml>, [access: 1.02.2020].

Abkhazia was ratified. The following years marked a period of apparent independence for the Abkhazian communists.<sup>27</sup> Despite the fact that the position of the Abkhazian SSR had been gradually lowered, for which Abkhazian historians blame Stalin, in December 1922 a representative of Abkhazia was one of the signatories of the document establishing the USSR. In the years 1924–1925, the official coat-of-arms and the flag were created and many legal regulations, including the Constitution, were passed. The first basic law of the Abkhazian SSR was announced during the third congress of the Abkhazian communists against Stalin's will. Historians regard merited Nestor Lakoba to be the father of this success.<sup>28</sup> The Constitution comprised a very interesting provision in the form of Article 5, which stipulated an option for the state to quit the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup> Aggression and numerous protests of the Georgian side were raised by Article 6 of the abovementioned basic law. According to its provisions the official language in the state was exclusively Russian. However, the Abkhazian legislator introduced an annotation that every person living in the Republic is free to use their own national language.<sup>30</sup> A question arises why were not two languages introduced, or just only the Abkhazian language?

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<sup>27</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 121, 155, 179.

<sup>28</sup> Rus. Нестор Аполлонович Лакоба (1893–1936)– Abkhazian socialist activist, according to Stalin himself regarded as his close friend. Poisoned in Tbilisi probably on Beria's order. More on this subject:

Авидзба (2013): 99–113; Лакоба (1936).

<sup>29</sup> Конституция Социалистической Советской Республики Абхазии 1925 года, Принята третьим Всеабхазским съездом Советов (26 марта–1 апреля 1925 г.), Art. 5. More on this subject: Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 155. Шамба, Непрошин (2004).

<sup>30</sup> Конституция Социалистической Советской Республики Абхазии 1925 года, Принята третьим Всеабхазским съездом Советов (26 марта–1 апреля 1925 г.), Art. 6.

The answer is simple - practically nobody in the Republic spoke the native language forced out as a result of *georgianization* and *russification* of the Abkhazian land. According to historian Kamil Janicki Article 6 led even to holding a debate in 1926, during which the Georgian side tried to exert pressure on the Abkhazian delegates to eliminate the provision about the Russian language. As a result of a compromise, three official languages began to function in Abkhazia: Abkhazian, Georgian and Russian.<sup>31</sup>

The time of collectivization was one of the gloomiest periods in the history of the USSR, which led to economic collapse famine and in consequence death of many people.<sup>32</sup> Historians frequently debated how the smallest republic within the Soviet Union had for many years defended itself against the policy initiated by Lenin and with great impetus continued by his successor.<sup>33</sup> Nestor Lakoba, recognized as the most energetically acting politician in the Caucasus and in fact the forefront figure on the Abkhazian political arena, known for his insubordination to Stalin, was very sceptical to mass collectivisation introduced in 1922. In many public statements Lakoba denied the existence of kulaks in Abkhazia<sup>34</sup> maintaining that the society was characterized by social

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<sup>31</sup> Janicki (2009): 164–165. A similar position is presented by: Бражба, Лакоба (2007): 155.

<sup>32</sup> Kuśnierz (2005): 336. More on this subject: Kuśnierz (2004): 29–46.

<sup>33</sup> Бражба, Лакоба (2007): 155. More on this subject: Авидзба (2013): 106; Шамба, Непрошин (2004).

<sup>34</sup> In Russia, a rich peasant. The word has a pejorative meaning. The propaganda image of a kulak as an oppressor of poor peasant and a political enemy of the communist party was extensively used in the period of war communism (*red terror*) and during force collectivization in the USSR and in the early 1950s in its dependent countries (also in Poland). Apart from kulaks, the victims of the anti-kulak policy in the countryside were mid-income peasants (*serednyaks*) as well as *bednyaks*

equality. With such policy he fell into disfavour with Moscow. In his letter of 1929, Stalin fiercely criticized Lakoba's activities, emphasizing his insubordination in fulfilling party directives.<sup>35</sup> Stanislav Lakoba and Oleg Bgaghba emphasize, Nestor Lakoba actually took steps that were contrary to the idea of communism and financially supported local princes and courtiers which was unthinkable in the Soviet Union.<sup>36</sup> As it turns out, the relations between communist politicians were correct, and some historians even call them friendly.<sup>37</sup> In the early 1930s Stalin expected a clear declaration of Abkhazia with respect to implementing collectivization. It put the Abkhazian leader in a very dire situation because he knew the intentions of the leader. Abkhazia has only two ways out of the situation: to implement collectivization and avoid being incorporated into the Georgian SSR (at least Stalin gave such promises) or join Georgia as an autonomy without carrying out collectivization. In this way the status of Abkhazia would deteriorate.<sup>38</sup> Seeing the strong pressure from the Kremlin and discontent of some Abkhazian communists who wanted to fully yield to the will of Moscow, Lakoba chose to join the Georgian SSR. That decision of the Abkhazian politician and his efforts aimed at the unification with Georgia are positively assessed by contemporary historians

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who had nothing but opposed collectivization. They were collectively called *podkulachniki* (sub-kulaks) and were treated the same as kulaks (victims of consecutive waves of fatal famine, deportations and gulags). See also: Sołżenicyn (2015): 52; Żurawski (2015): 260.

<sup>35</sup> Бражба, Лакоба (2007): 155.

<sup>36</sup> Ibidem. More on this subject: Куправа (2015): 79.

<sup>37</sup> Лакоба (2004): 101–112. More on this subject: Перевозкин (2011): 1–15; Шнирельман (2003): 267; Лакоба (1990).

<sup>38</sup> Шнирельман (2003): 267. More on this subject: Лакоба (1990): 94.

and politologists.<sup>39</sup> Seen the negative effects of collectivization Lakoba made a right decision being guided by the well-being of his compatriots. The politician knew well what did the Stalinist collectivization involve and being a good observer he saw what did Stalin's brutal moves did to Russian peasants.<sup>40</sup> According to the historian from the University in Sukhumi the population of Abkhazia would not have survived mass collectivization while the peasants would have been subject to repressions. Eventually, on 19 February 1931, the Abkhazian SSR cease to exist and was incorporated by the Georgian SSR. It took place during the 6<sup>th</sup> Georgian communist congress. The status of the former Soviet Republic was reduced to the level of an autonomous republic functioning within the Georgian SSR. Lakoba, regarded as a very active politician and a patriot, could not accept the fact that his homeland had been deprived of the highest status with the USSR and had been subordinated to the Georgians that were hated by the people. To this end he staged a plot which was meant to scare Moscow and dissuade it from collectivization and incorporation into Georgia. Upon his instruction, the Abkhazian peasants roused a number of riots and strikes the largest of which took place between 18 and 26 February 1931 in the village of Duripsh.<sup>41</sup> According to Abkhazian historians, an active participant in the anti-Georgian rebellions was Lakoba's mother. Finally, the peasants gave up having been informed about the approaching armed units under

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<sup>39</sup> Шамба, Непрошин (2004). More on this subject: Janicki (2009): 165–167; Czachor (2014): 109; Шнирельман (2003): 267; Hewitt (2013): 85.

<sup>40</sup> Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 155–156.

<sup>41</sup> Rus. Дурѣпш.

the command of Lavrentiy Beria.<sup>42</sup> According to Rafał Czachor depriving the Abkhazians of the possibility of self-determination was a hotbed of conflict in the Caucasus which was present in the history of the currently unrecognized state until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Abkhazians were deprived of the possibility to decide about their homeland and exert influence on the demographic, economic and cultural situation. The scholar notes that the local population put all the blame not on the central authorities in Moscow, but on the Georgians, for whom the receiving of the Abkhazian land was a sign of historical justice.<sup>43</sup>

### Conclusions

In light of many events in the history of Abkhazia and its road to self-determination, the figure of Nestor Lakoba is positively assessed by contemporary historians and politologists. Despite the fact of being a member of the communist apparatus of power, that politician was guided primarily by the wellbeing of his nation and homeland. He was aware that the Stalinist policy had many shortcomings, brutality and no respect for many nationalities living in the USSR.<sup>44</sup> In the opinion of politologist Rafał Czachor, it was thanks to Nestor Lakoba that Abkhazia for such a long time withstood the pressure from the Kremlin, collectivization and incorporation into the Georgian SRR. Most probably, a significant role was also played by the fact that the politician knew well

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<sup>42</sup> Ibidem: 156. More on this subject: Куправа (2015): 586.

<sup>43</sup> Czachor (2014): 109.

<sup>44</sup> Шнирельман (2003): 267. More on this subject: Hewitt (2013): 86; Бгажба, Лакоба (2007): 155.

Joseph Stalin.<sup>45</sup> The finally unexplained death of the head of the Abkhazian Republic in December 1926 in Tbilisi marked the beginning of a subsequent black period of Abkhazian history. Lakoba was most probably poisoned during a meeting with Beria, ordered by the leader of the USSR.<sup>46</sup> According to historian Kamil Janicki the murder sealed the end of the era initiated by Lenin – *rootinization* and marked the beginning of mass Stalinist cleansing, which were seen by the Abkhazian as a return of *muhajirstvo*.<sup>47</sup>

Undoubtedly, the political situation turned to the worse after the death of the leader of Abkhazian communists. Buried with honours, shortly after his funeral Lakoba was branded as the enemy of the nation. His death was followed by an unexpected wave of mass repressions which hit politicians associated with Lakoba, the intelligentsia and representatives of broadly conceived culture. It was but another attempt at robbing the indigenous population from its cultural heritage starting with the national language.

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<sup>45</sup> Czachor (2104): 110. More on this subject: Бражба, Лакоба (2007): 109–110.

<sup>46</sup> Czachor (2014): 110. A similar position is presented by: Бражба, Лакоба (2007): 180.

<sup>47</sup> Janicki (2009): 166. A similar position is presented by: В. Шнирельман (2003): 268.

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Eduard Prys

## **Soviet antifascism as main narrative of the Russian propaganda in hybrid warfare**

### Abstract

The myth of the Great Patriotic War which is also known as the Great Fatherland War has always been one of main messages of Russian propaganda on post-Soviet space. Russia combines antifascist rhetoric with manipulating historical facts in order to justify the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in the East of Ukraine. The article describes how the Russian Federation uses the topic of antifascist struggle against Nazi Germany in its aggressive foreign policy against the neighboring countries.

**Key words:** Antifascism, Russia, Poland, World War II, Putin, Ukraine, Donbas, Holocaust, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, European Union, Moscow, Crimea

## Introduction

The Russian historical and political narrative, known as the Great Fatherland War, has been a very strong political instrument of Soviet and later Russian foreign policy. Participation of the Soviet Union in anti-Hitler coalition made it possible to avoid the Nuremberg trials for communists what allows Russia to criticize those countries which cooperated with Nazis during the World War II and in the same time avoid counter-criticism connected with crimes against humanity and genocide which took place in the Soviet Union as well.

On the one hand, there is strong policy of memory of the West and Russia aimed at fighting with ideological reborn of Nazism but on the other hand this common vision of a threat of ideological reborn mentioned above does not allow Western Europe and the United States to give objective estimate of Russian role in the beginning of World War II and its totalitarian policy resulted in repressions, Soviet concentration camps, deportations and mass executions.

Main narrative of Russian propaganda in the post-Soviet space has been built on negating the right to sovereignty of all those states which were members of the Soviet Union and declared independence in 1991.

Antifascism during the Second World War and blaming for a treason all the states which did not want to be a part of the USSR are being used to manipulate public opinion in Russia and undermine international authority of those countries which collaborated with Nazi Germany in order to fight with Soviet occupation of their territory.

As it is known, usually collaboration and membership of Ukrainian, Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian nationals

in Waffen SS units was rather a kind of pact with the devil than ideologically motivated. Nevertheless, it is very complex task to differentiate ideologically motivated collaborators and those who only wanted to fight with another aggressor who was not less cruel than Nazi Germany.

Antifascist narrative was not chosen by accident because it was targeted not only on the Western audience but first of all on the people inhabiting post-communist countries.

The only one reason why antifascism was chosen as a tool of propaganda is because of its great information potential and ability to consolidate all those people who have nostalgic feelings connected with the early period of their lives spent in the USSR.

Does not matter whether we like it or not, but the vast majority of former Soviet citizens was educated according to Soviet ideological dogmas which has created a one-sided perception of the Second World War. That is why if someone called a Nazi or a fascist it always causes negative historical connotations among the nationals of post-communist countries.

As for Russia, the newly created Russian Federation did not undergo political transition which allowed Soviet elites to save their influence and avoid responsibility for crimes of communism and at the same time use Soviet totalitarian narratives in modern propaganda against all those states which have chosen joining the EU and NATO.

### **USA and the European Union – how Russia uses ideological polarization to affect US-EU foreign policy?**

In 2020, when Black Lives Matter protests started in Minneapolis, we could see how deep American society is divided

on ideological camps of “democrats” and “republicans”. The same processes had a place in the European Union during the active phase of the migration crisis 2015.<sup>1</sup>

As for the European Union, the main reason for ideological conflicts in the EU was the discussion on the issue of what to do with refugees who started to arrive in Europe trying to escape a war in their home countries. All those who had something against “Open door policy” were blamed for Nazism or anti-Semitism.

**Nevertheless, such rhetoric led to results  
which were different from expected outcomes.**

Social outrage caused by short-sighted migration policy was successfully used by right-wing politicians to gain more electoral support of those who are not satisfied with migration policy of European governments.<sup>2</sup>

As for the USA, we can see how American internal and foreign policy has been changing since Biden’s victory and the assault on the Capitol in January 2021. Instead of focusing on decreasing of still high level of religiously motivated terrorism or Russian activity, the United States declared a war on so called “white supremacy terrorism” what, unfortunately, seems to be a policy of aggressive appeasing of Donald Trump followers but not a struggle with real terrorist threat or new form of terrorism.

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<sup>1</sup> Rose (2020), URL = <https://www.npr.org/2020/09/03/908878610/americans-increasingly-polarized-when-it-comes-to-racial-justice-protests-poll-f>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>2</sup> Isen (2021), URL = <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/18/europe-is-proof-that-right-wing-populism-is-here-stay/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

In comparison to 9/11 there was no any significant event which could be defined as a kind of casus belli to start the new war on terrorism. Despite that fact, Joe Biden defines white supremacy as “the most lethal threat” for American national security.<sup>3</sup>

For instance, the report about white supremacy terrorism “White Supremacy Extremism: The Transnational Rise Of The Violent White Supremacist Movement”, published by the Soufan Center, covers only two cases which authors define as high-profile attacks. One of them occurred in the territory of Europe in 2011 and another one took place in 2019 in Oceania.<sup>4</sup>

First case it is a terrorist attack in Oslo prepared by Andreas Breivik in 2011 and another is mass shooting in mosques which happened in Christchurch in 2019.

In the EU, according to the data of European Parliament, 436 terrorists who are responsible for 21 terrorist attacks were arrested in 2019. It cannot even be compared with quantity of white supremacy high-profile attacks. There are only two attacks for 8 years and 21 religiously motivated attacks per year.<sup>5</sup>

So the timeline and geography between those two attacks is too long, which does not show that there is any ideological trend instigated by the idea of white supremacy.

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<sup>3</sup> Singh, Greve (2021), URL = <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2021/jun/01/joe-biden-tulsa-oklahoma-race-massacre-us-politics-live>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>4</sup> White Supremacy Extremism: The Transnational Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement, the Soufan Center, URL = <https://thesoufancenter.org/research/white-supremacy-extremism-the-transnational-rise-of-the-violent-white-supremacist-movement/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>5</sup> “Terrorism in the EU: terror attacks, deaths and arrests in 2019”, European Parliament, URL = <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20180703STO07125/terrorism-in-the-eu-terror-attacks-deaths-and-arrests-in-2019>, [access: 25.12.2021].

Similar political obsession is also popular in the European Union where politicians still fight with the “boogeyman” known as a shadow of Nazism despite the fact that this ideology is popular only among quite marginalized population segments.

All these things were described not for lyrical digression but for explaining *modus operandi* and some algorithms of Russian propaganda which Moscow adapts to different political situations.

In Europe, Russians support right-wing political parties which usually have a Eurosceptic political attitude and openly call others to cancel economic sanctions against Russia imposed for the annexation of Crimea and armed aggression in Eastern Ukraine.

Except “foreign direct investment” in political campaigns of right-wing populists, like in the presidential campaign of Marine Le Pen, Russia also has also been using another method of political corruption and lobbying its interests in Europe.

The leader of National Front Marine Le Pen borrowed 9 million euro from the Russian Bank for her run in 2017.<sup>6</sup>

This method is not a paying of bribes but employment of former policy makers of the highest level. Except for the French National Front, one of the most prominent examples would probably be former federal chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder who was hired by Russia and has been working as the chairman of the board of Nord Stream AG and of Rosneft.

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<sup>6</sup> “Le Pen’s far-right party reaches settlement on Russian bank debt: court”, Reuters, URL = <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-france-politics-idUKKBN23F1AH>, [access: 25.12.2021].



Such a method is very effective because it avoids political scandals connected with corruption. Schroeder is one of the most famous Russian lobbyists who called the European Union for canceling economic sanctions against Russia.<sup>7</sup>

To those who lobbied Russian interests in the EU can also be included former Czech president Miloš Zeman and former chancellor of Austria Sebastian Kurz. In 2014, Zeman repeated the main Russian narrative about the “civil war” in Ukraine. This statement was made during the Dialogue of Civilizations conference where he also mentioned that Ukraine can become a kind of terrorist heaven like Libya and Iraq.<sup>8</sup>

In 2017, Zeman shocked the international community one more time when he said that Ukraine should consider an option to sell Crimea to Russia.<sup>9</sup>

As for Sebastian Kurz who is already retired, the former Austrian chancellor spoke out against new anti-Russian sanctions which were imposed by the European Union.

According to his statement, sanctions are not effective and lead only to escalation while all sides need de-escalation of the conflict.<sup>10</sup> These words were said in 2021 but in 2018

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<sup>7</sup> Schelee, URL = <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-calls-for-sanctions-against-gerhard-schroeder/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>8</sup> “President Zeman calls for lifting of Russia sanctions at event organized by Putin associate”, Radio Prague International, URL = <https://english.radio.cz/president-zeman-calls-lifting-russia-sanctions-event-organized-putin-associate-8282519>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>9</sup> “Czech president suggests Ukraine sell Crimea”, Ukraine Crisis, URL = <https://uacrisis.org/en/61201-czech-president-suggests-ukraine-sell-crimea>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>10</sup> “Austrian chancellor speaks out against new EU anti-Russian sanctions”, TASS, URL = <https://tass.com/world/1283215>, [access: 25.12.2021].

Putin lobbied canceling economic sanctions during his visit to Vienna. He defined anti-Russian sanctions as counterproductive and harmful for everyone.<sup>11</sup>

Main narrative of Russian TV during the Dignity Revolution and first two-three years of the war in Ukraine was about fighting with Ukrainian Nazis who kill Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and started anti-Russian genocide on Donbas.

Russia did not refuse from this approach in its foreign policy towards Ukraine. Not so long ago, in 2021, Vladimir Putin told that Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky is under influence of Ukrainian radical Nazis that is why there is no progress in the conflict resolution. This accusation was voiced during the last press conference of the Russian president in Moscow.<sup>12</sup>

This strategy was chosen not only because of vulnerability of the West in historical issues connected with memory about the Holocaust or World War II but also because of ingrained stereotype of the Soviet army as heroes who have never committed any war crimes according to official communist propaganda which still has strong influence in post-communist states.

There are only good Soviet people who won the war and bad Nazis who are responsible for concentration camps and mass executions of Jewish people. In Europe, the issue of the ideological rebirth of Nazism is a part of historical

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<sup>11</sup> “Russian President Vladimir Putin lobbies in Vienna for end to EU sanctions”, DW, URL = <https://www.dw.com/en/russian-president-vladimir-putin-lobbies-in-vienna-for-end-to-eu-sanctions/a-44087406>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>12</sup> “Ukrainian ‘Nazis’ have taken control of Zelensky, Putin claims”, RT, URL = <https://www.rt.com/russia/544248-zelensky-nazi-influence-putin/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

discussion and harmonization of politics of memory while in the USA it is rather a political and ideological topic.

The USA has also created a collective “boogeyman” of omnipresent fascists, white supremacists and neo-Nazis while so called anti-fascist groups become more and more aggressive and intolerant to alternative points of view.

For example, according to the Cato national survey, there are 62% of Americans who are afraid to share their political views, which proves that freedom of speech is in danger. 77% of people who have conservative beliefs and who participated in the survey say that the current political climate prevents them from expressing their political views because someone can treat them as offensive.<sup>13</sup>

Russian propagandists use this situation trying to present Ukraine as a Nazi state where authorities are terrorized by radical nationalist groups who cooperate with American white supremacy groups. As it known, last year, American congress wanted to include volunteer regiment “Azov” which is accountable to Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior and National Guard of Ukraine to the list of foreign terrorist organization.

There is no any strong evidence except assumptions that American white supremacists were trained by the “Azov” regiment nevertheless this case was broadly discussed in Ukraine and the United States.

Russia is trying to use social obsession connected with the fears imposed by the media and show that Moscow is also interested in fighting white supremacy in Ukraine.

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<sup>13</sup> Ekins, URL = <https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/poll-62-americans-say-they-have-political-views-theyre-afraid-share#introduction>, [access: 25.12.2021].

It is worth mentioning that the Russian embassy in the USA welcomed this idea and emphasized the importance of the struggle against rebirth of far-right extremism.<sup>14</sup>

Similar trick Putin used during the war in Chechnya. When World Trade Center was destroyed by terrorists Russia has also joined the crusade known as American war on terrorism.<sup>15</sup>

Unfortunately for Chechens, the West believed in Putin's version that the Chechen war it is a part of the war on terrorism what lead to significant decreasing of support for Chechen people in international arena.<sup>16</sup>

That is quite interesting because Russia which has been blaming Ukraine for supporting Nazis allows its own neo-Nazi groups to conduct trainings for foreigners from the EU. For instance, Russian Imperial Movement which legally exists in Russia was included by the USA to the list of foreign terrorist organizations because of military trainings for people who are considered to be representatives of so called European far-right groups.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> "US Congress starts realizing threat from Ukraine's neo-Nazi Azov battalion — Russian envoy", TASS, URL = <https://tass.com/politics/1084906>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>15</sup> Stent (2021), "The impact of September 11 on US-Russian relations, Brookings, URL = <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/08/the-impact-of-september-11-on-us-russian-relations/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>16</sup> Hawkes (2011), URL = <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/30/how-has-russia-framed-the-conflict-in-chechnya-as-part-of-the-%E2%80%98war-on-terror%E2%80%99/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>17</sup> "United States Designates Russian Imperial Movement and Leaders as Global Terrorists", US Department of State, URL = <https://2017-2021.state.gov/united-states-designates-russian-imperial-movement-and-leaders-as-global-terrorists/index.html>, [access: 25.12.2021].

At the same time Russia continues to use antifascist rhetoric and blame Kyiv for supporting Nazism in order to justify its aggression and war crimes in Ukraine.<sup>18</sup>

### **Crimea and Donbas: case study of Soviet-Russian antifascism**

As was already mentioned above, all Russian propaganda against Ukraine was based on a narrative about Nazi coup d'état organized by Ukrainian radicals who overthrew legally elected president Victor Yanukovich.

When it was evident that there is no any chance that Victor Yunukovich will be able to remain in office till the end of his cadency, Russian TV started to tell that nationalists who overthrew the president move to Crimea and Donbas to kill Russian-speaking population that is why Putin asked the parliament permission to use Russian army for intervention to Crimea.<sup>19</sup>

Simultaneously with the intervention and occupation of Crimean peninsula Russian secret services started to provoke pro-Russian demonstrations on Donbas supplying weapons and declaring independence of the cities from Ukraine.<sup>20</sup>

That is the way how terrorist groups operating in Eastern Ukraine and known as Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic were established.

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<sup>18</sup> Staff, URL = <https://www.timesofisrael.com/amid-escalating-tensions-russia-claims-to-arrest-ukrainian-neo-nazis/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>19</sup> Dearden, URL = <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-putin-asks-russian-parliament-s-permission-for-military-intervention-in-crimea-9162253.html>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>20</sup> Grove, Strobel, URL = <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-arms-specialreport-idUSKBN0FY0UA20140729>, [access: 25.12.2021].

Ukraine has been represented as a fascist country from the very beginning of the conflict which was reflected in Kremlin's propaganda. In Crimea, Russia offered to choose between Russian "home harbor" and Crimea under Ukrainian "fascist rule".<sup>21</sup>

Similar policy was also implemented by Russia in those parts which are controlled by Russian-backed terrorists. Except for the antifascist narrative represented as a crusade against Ukrainian fascism, an international Antifascist forum was held in Donetsk in 2019.

This forum was presented as a declaration of international solidarity with the people of Donetsk People's Republic in their struggle against fascist regime in Kyiv. As was written in the report, delegations from Russia, Germany, Spain, Colombia, Latvia and Turkey visited this event.<sup>22</sup>

This was made to confirm the version about antifascist intentions of quasi-republics which get military, humanitarian and economic assistance from Russia.

### **Putin's participation in the World Holocaust Forum as a tool in Russian information war**

It is quite interesting to monitor how Russia supports those political parties which are often blamed for anti-Semitism and in the same time participates in World Holocaust Forum

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<sup>21</sup> Black, URL = <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/crimean-nazi-billboard-highlights-propaganda-problem-u-s-n49501>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>22</sup> International Anti-Fascist Forum held in Donetsk People's Republic, Вперед, URL = <http://wpered.su/2019/05/11/international-anti-fascist-forum-held-in-donetsk-peoples-republic/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

trying to accuse Ukraine for Nazism and Poland for the beginning of World War II.<sup>23</sup>

If someone in Russia tries to draw attention of the society to the fact that the Soviet Union and III Reich signed the pact of non-aggression and divided Poland on the spheres of influence he risks being imprisoned for destroying memory about the Great Fatherland War. Russian blogger Vladimir Luzgin was fined 200 thousands rubles for reposting the text where Nazi-Soviet collaboration was mentioned.<sup>24</sup>

This decision was made by Russia's Supreme Court which convicted Luzgin for "rehabilitation of Nazism".

One more important fact, that Russian policy makers avoid the definition "World War II" and try to substitute it by "the Great Fatherland War". This approach will, for sure, lead to erasing the very uncomfortable Russia date which proves its role in the outbreak of World War II.

Russian high-ranking official Viacheslav Volodin said that Europe exists and can develop only thanks to the sacrifice of Soviet soldiers but today the West wants to rewrite history.

*"The US enjoys its power and economy. This state has really accomplished a lot. But there is a question: thanks to whom? In that war, which was impossible to win without a Soviet soldier, the US authorities appreciated the support of the Soviet Union. Both Churchill and Roosevelt talked about that. But soon*

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<sup>23</sup> Vitting, URL = <https://www.dw.com/en/german-politicians-slam-right-wing-populist-afd-over-rising-anti-semitism/a-50893368>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>24</sup> Coynash, URL = <https://khp.org/en/1472775460>, [access: 25.12.2021].

*after the war had been won, they began to rewrite history,” - Volodin mentioned<sup>25</sup>*

One more front of information war is memory conflict between Israel and Poland connected with responsibility for the Holocaust and participation of Polish nationals in exterminating Jewish people.<sup>26</sup>

Politics of memory is also a strong weapon in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Antifascism is a never-ending story in Moscow's foreign policy aimed against its neighbors. This narrative is used to depreciate the rhetoric of those countries which treat their communist past not as the period of prosperity and sustainable development but as the century of foreign occupation.<sup>27</sup>

In 2020, Putin became the guest of honor on the World Holocaust Forum. Before we explain the importance of this forum, we should focus on another event which is very important for better understanding of Russia's strategy in information war.

Approximately one week before the forum started, Vladimir Putin said that Poland is responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War while the speaker of Russian parliament called Poland to apologize for the beginning of the war.

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<sup>25</sup> “Viacheslav Volodin: disrespect of other states for the memory of the war would affect their relations with Russia”, the State Duma, URL = <http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/51426/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>26</sup> Syam, URL = <https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2019-12-26/Putin-accuses-Poland-of-anti-Semitism-and-colluding-with-Hitler-MItUVF69m8/index.html>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>27</sup> Domańska (2019), URL = [https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2019-12-31/myth-great-patriotic-war-a-tool-kremlins-great-power-policy#\\_ftn6](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2019-12-31/myth-great-patriotic-war-a-tool-kremlins-great-power-policy#_ftn6), [access: 25.12.2021].



The accusation was voiced before the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the commemoration of the liberation of Auschwitz<sup>28</sup>

During this event participation of Poland and its contribution in the struggle against Nazism was totally neglected. Instead of that, those who organized the forum focused on the Soviet contribution.

Of course, Putin, as always, talked about the heroism of Russians during the war, which can be defined as one of the biggest manipulations of the Russian president. Unfortunately, Moscow has always been trying to monopolize the topic of victory in the Second World War and use it in its foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR.

There are two sides to the Soviet role in World War II but Putin preferred to talk only about one side known as Soviet membership in Anti-Hitler Coalition. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and common parade of Soviet-German troops in jointly-occupied Brest also was not discussed during the forum in Yad Vashem.<sup>29</sup>

When Russian propaganda tells about exclusive role of Russian people in destroying Nazi Germany it neglects contribution of all the rest of 15 Soviet republics which were member-states of the Soviet Union. The Victory Day which is celebrated on May 9 is one of the most popular among Russians national holidays.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Applebaum (2020), URL = <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/putin-blames-poland-world-war-ii/604426/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>29</sup> Staff, URL = <https://www.timesofisrael.com/yad-vashem-apologizes-for-distortions-favoring-russia-at-holocaust-forum/>, [access: 25.12.2021].

<sup>30</sup> “Is Putin trying to monopolise the victory over Nazi Germany?”, URL = <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/1/why-putin-wants-to-monopolise-victory-over-nazi-germany>, [access: 25.12.2021].

As a rule, official propaganda exaggerates the contribution of the Soviet army while the contribution of allied forces has been minimized. Any comparison of Hitler and Stalin are prohibited as well.<sup>31</sup>

It is not an accident but deliberate Russian politics of memory targeted at undermining the authority of those countries which do not want to be in the sphere of influence of Moscow.

The forum was ignored by Polish authorities due to the presence of Russian president Vladimir Putin and lack of permission of president of Poland Andrzej Duda to deliver the speech dedicated to the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.

Putin's speech was strongly criticized by Poland because of rewriting the history of the Second World War.<sup>32</sup>

### Conclusion

Summing up this article, we can say that Russia combines different hybrid strategies connected with the politics of memory about the World War II, the Holocaust and the influence of these tragic events on contemporary history as well.

Lack of objective and fair estimation of communist past in the West led to ideological rebirth of aggressive Soviet-Russian territorial and political revisionism which is justified not only by historical justice but the post-Cold War ideological perception of international politics.

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<sup>31</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>32</sup> Gwozdz-Palokat, URL = <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-protests-vladimir-putins-speech-at-holocaust-event/a-51976119>, [access: 25.12.2021].

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It also causes the situation when Russian information narratives about Nazism are treated as true but not as an information campaign targeted at undermining international authority of former Soviet member-states.

Except Ukraine which has been a victim of this propaganda since 2014, Russia expands the information front on the EU and NATO countries in order to explain its aggressive intentions.

Unlike Nazi ideology, communism is not treated in the same way on the West what allows Russia to exploit this topic with goal to start new wars against every state which were defined by Moscow as a fascist regimes.

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## **Generational Specificity of Socio-Political Transformation in Georgia: Between Tradition and Modernity**

### **Abstract**

The purpose of the article was to analyze the generational transformation and outline the characteristics of individual generations. Moreover, the concept of V. Papava with the concept pointing to general generational trends was juxtaposed. This analysis allowed me to characterize the young generation of Georgians in relation to other generations. To analyze this research problem, I used a number of research methods based in part on secondary sources. The basic research methods used in the article are the method of analyzing existing data and the comparative method, which allowed for juxtaposing the division into generations proposed by V. Papava with the general characteristics of global generation trends. Secondary statistical data studies from the Caucasus Research Resource Center completed the above-mentioned methods, allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the generations. This article is a snapshot of studies on the generational transformation of Georgian society and is part of the series of articles on the young generation of Georgians and their opinions about democracy and democratization.

**Keywords:** transformation, Georgia, generation, young people, democratization, democracy

## Specyfika pokoleniowa transformacji społeczno-politycznej w Gruzji: między tradycją a nowoczesnością

### Abstrakt

Celem artykułu była analiza przemian pokoleniowych oraz zarysowanie cech poszczególnych pokoleń w społeczeństwie gruzińskim. Ponadto, w artykule zestawiono również koncepcję pokoleń V. Papawy z koncepcją wskazującą na ogólne trendy pokoleniowe. Analiza ta pozwoliła autorce scharakteryzować młode pokolenie Gruzinów na tle innych pokoleń. Do analizy tego problemu badawczego wykorzystano szereg metod badawczych opartych częściowo na źródłach wtórnych. Podstawowymi metodami badawczymi zastosowanymi w artykule są metoda analizy danych zastanych oraz metoda porównawcza, które pozwoliły na dokonanie podziału na pokolenia zaproponowane przez V. Papava z ogólną charakterystyką światowych trendów generacyjnych, oraz pozwoliły na zestawienie różnic i podobieństw w kontekście tych koncepcji. Badania wtórnych danych statystycznych z Kaukaskiego Centrum Zasobów Badawczych (Caucasus Research Resource Center) uzupełniły wyżej wymienione metody, pozwalając na dogłębną analizę wskazanych pokoleń. Artykuł ten stanowi przyczynek do dalszych badań nad przemianami pokoleniowymi społeczeństwa gruzińskiego i jest częścią cyklu artykułów o młodym pokoleniu Gruzinów i jego opiniach na temat demokracji i demokratyzacji.

**Słowa kluczowe:** transformacja, Gruzja, pokolenie, młodzi, demokratyzacja, demokracja

## 1. Preliminary Remarks

The concept of “transformation” means a complete change—in the case of a systemic transformation it means drastic changes in the political system of a state. This profound restructuring of power affects not only political life but also society itself in terms of values and identity<sup>1</sup>. The essence of the transformation in the post-Soviet area was the transition from the authoritarian (communist) regime imposed from the outside to building a democracy. Two generations participated in this transformation in Georgia in 1991. As a result, the present-day Georgian society, made up of four generations, has adopted certain values and patterns of behavior from previous generations and new values promoted from the outside as part of democratization. According to G. Godlewski, the present generations living in the world: “(...) have their own dictionaries and symbols, cognitive categories and patterns of feelings, forms of communication and models of friendship, myths, and projects of the future. It is not just different environments or social strata—they are different cultures” [translation]<sup>2</sup>. The situation is similar in the case of Georgian society. This article is a snapshot of studies on the generational transformation of Georgian society.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the generational transformation and outline the characteristics of individual generations. Moreover, I juxtaposed the concept of V. Papava (which can be considered quite controversial, yet in my opinion it is adequate to the situation of Georgia) with the concept pointing to general generational trends. This analysis will

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<sup>1</sup> Turska (1994).

<sup>2</sup> Godlewski (2002): 60.

allow me to characterize the young generation of Georgians in relation to other generations. The issue studied is particularly important: Firstly, due to the specific type of transformation that took place in the post-Soviet states, the transformation taking place not only within political structures, but also in society. Secondly, it is the systemic transformation and the current democratization of Georgia that is driven by the generations that currently function and operate within this system. However, this analysis focuses mainly on the identification of the young generation that will constitute the new elite of Georgian society in the near future. It is this generation that constitutes the core for further research on the perception of democracy and democratization in Georgia. The objective of this paper indicates, firstly, a comparison of the generations of Georgian society with the global characteristics of generations, and secondly, it indicates a young generation that is internally conflicted.

To analyze this research problem, I used a number of research methods based in part on secondary sources. The basic research methods used in the article are the method of analyzing existing data and the comparative method, which allowed for juxtaposing the division into generations proposed by V. Papava with the general characteristics of global generation trends. Secondary statistical data studies from the Caucasus Research Resource Center completed the above-mentioned methods, allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the generations.

The article is part of the series of articles on the young generation of Georgians and their opinions about democracy and democratization.

## 2. Generational Transformation: General Thoughts

Over the years, the communist system evoked a certain sense of security in post-Soviet societies, dominating most spheres of life. Currently, in many countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, societies expect a change in the styles and forms of governance, without having a clear vision of the opportunities and threats that will accompany such transformations at the social level.

According to the adopted definition of “transformation,” I have divided the transformations in Georgia into two. The first socio-political transformation was the systemic transformation of 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which took place in the context of the beginning of the transition from socialism to democracy, and at the same time from a centrally planned economy to capitalism. This change can be described as imitative and as a “West-oriented” transformation. J. Tatum emphasizes that there have been two waves of social change in Georgia. The first was the struggle for independence and the spurring of nationalism in 1991, and the second was the correction of the mistakes of the first wave, the Rose Revolution. Under this second wave, democratization, Europeanization, and westernization were particularly strong<sup>3</sup>. The main goal of the Rose Revolution was to eliminate Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime in order to enable Georgia to transform into a modern and democratic state<sup>4</sup>.

The above changes were related to the transformation of generations. According to V. Papava, the specificity of such


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<sup>3</sup> Tatum (2009): 156–171.

<sup>4</sup> Lavert (2008): 143–161.

a transformation in the post-Soviet area was the transformation from *homo sovieticus* into *homo transformaticus* and *homo oeconomicus*<sup>5</sup>. In my opinion, one more transformation is taking place within Georgian society—into a paradoxical generation, i.e., the youngest generation born after 2000 (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Generational Transformation in Georgia Since 1930.



Source: Own study.

\*The red lines show the two transformations (1991 transformation and the Rose Revolution)

### 3. Transformation from *Homo Sovieticus* to *Homo Transformaticus*

According to V. Papava, the *homo sovieticus* generation, born in 1930–1945,<sup>6</sup> are people who lived during the Soviet

<sup>5</sup> Papava (2005).

<sup>6</sup> In other words, “Silent Generation” according to the general standards of research on generations and generations. The term was first used by the Times in 1951 to refer to people born in 1928–1945, people who were afraid to “speak out.” According to the Pew Research Center, these are people born 1928–1945, according

rule and were not familiar with the first version of democratic Georgia (1918–1921). Similarly, *The Moscow Times* defines *homo sovieticus* as “(...) the archetype of a person born and shaped by a totalitarian regime [translation]”. The concept of the *homo sovieticus* generation by V. Papava can be compared with the term “Silent Generation.” It is recognized that this generation is characterized by traditionalism, a great sense of duty, and the need for security. Due to the characteristics of the silent generation according to the universal values of Sh. Schwartz<sup>7</sup>, I recognized that the *homo sovieticus* generation is its Georgian / post-Soviet counterpart (Table 1).

Table 1. Characteristics of the Generations from 1930 to the Present

(see pages 80–85)

Source: Own study based on the literature on the subject.

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to the Resolution Foundation 1926–1945, Strauss and Howe 1925–1941 for Canadian society; URL = [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233466490\\_Profiling\\_the\\_Silent\\_Generation](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233466490_Profiling_the_Silent_Generation)

<sup>7</sup> Schwartz (2012).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Veterans/ Silent Generation/ <i>Homo sovieticus</i>	1930–1945 (74–89 years old)			<p>Family of the sovieticus type - a Soviet consumer and authoritarian family whose members have state-guaranteed employment and a decent standard of living, a retirement pension. The state budget provides funding for social welfare, health care, and education.</p> <p>His / her main source of income are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Salaries, pensions, and social aid from public funds.</li> <li>2) In small towns and villages, he / she has his / her own subsidiary farm, from which he / she consumes part of the proceeds from the product in kind and receives part of the proceeds from the sale of the part (since the latter was largely unregistered by the state, this was reflected in the family income as hidden income).</li> <li>3) The socioeconomic strata (types) of family members were represented as: servants, workers, and peasants.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Openness to changes: little open to changes;</li> <li>2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; "Whatever God gives;"</li> <li>3. Conservation (tradition, sense of security and conformity): very important for each generation, but especially for this one (as much as 97% of respondents!);</li> </ol>	<p>This generation would definitely not like to have a homosexual person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (42%) as a neighbor; other races (36%); another language (26%), immigrants (37%).</p>



Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Baby Boomers/ <i>Homo transformaticus</i>	1946–1969 (50–73 years old)		A homo transformaticus who is partially developed, based on privatization and mainly on newly formed private structures. Such people are still afraid of the state. They still try to maintain dependence on the state and expect its help. They gradually adjust to the rules of the market economy.	The transformaticus family - a kind of family moving from a socialist farm to a market economy. Types of members of the transformaticus family (according to the sociological survey of 1997) can be summarized as follows: 1) New Georgians; 2) optimist"; 3) socialists; 4) Traditionals 5) Conservatives; 6) Europeans; 7) Pioneers	1. Openness to changes: little open to changes; 2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; "Whatever God gives;" 3. Conservation (tradition, sense of security and conformism): very important for each generation, but especially for this one (as much as 97% of respondents!);	This generation would definitely not want to have a homosexual person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (37%) as a neighbor; other races (36%); another language (23%), immigrants (35%).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimer Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Generation X <i>/Homo transformicus</i>	1970–1980 (40–49 years old)/1970–1990 (29–40 years old)				<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Openness to changes: open to changes;</li> <li>2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; "Whatever God gives;"</li> <li>3. Conservation (traditions, security and conformity): very important for each generation</li> </ol>	This generation would definitely not like to have homosexuals (as many as 86%) or people of another faith (34%) as a neighbor; other races (32%); another language (20%), immigrants (34%).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Generation Y (Millennials, <i>Homo economicus</i> )	1990–2000 (19–29 years old)	Portrait of the young generation (14-29 years old): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 85% believers</li> <li>• 47% after high school</li> <li>• 70% live with their parents</li> <li>• 62% financially dependent on parents</li> <li>• 55% get along with their parents</li> <li>• 34% do not work</li> <li>• 42% would prefer to work in the public sector</li> <li>• 87% have their own business</li> </ul>			1. Openness to change: very open to change; 2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; 3. Conservation (traditions, sense of security and conformism): very important for each generation.	This generation shows a similar attitude as the older generations, but the trend is definitely declining: homosexuals (79%, 18-25 years old and 89% 26-35 years old).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
<i>Generation Z / Homo economicus</i> (V. Papava); Paradoxical generation (K. Skiert-Andrzejuk)	After 2000 (19 and younger)	Portrait of the young generation (14-29 years old): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 85% believers</li> <li>• 47% after high school</li> <li>• 70% live with their parents</li> <li>• 62% financially dependent on parents</li> <li>• 55% get along with their parents</li> <li>• 34% do not work</li> <li>• 42% would prefer to work in the public sector</li> <li>• 87% have their own business</li> <li>• 94% do not attend any social gatherings</li> <li>• 94% are not socially and politically active online</li> <li>• 46% are not interested in the development of other countries</li> <li>• 81% trust only God</li> <li>• 42% believe abortion should be prohibited</li> <li>• 46% do not trust LGBT people</li> <li>• 43% would like to get married</li> </ul>			1. Openness to change: very open to change; 2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; 3. Conservation (traditions, security and conformism): very important for each generation	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 1% of women had more than 1 sexual partner</li><li>• 56% feel Georgian, 20% individuals, 19% world citizens.</li><li>• 57% of men have had more than 1 sexual partner 1% of women have had more than 1 sexual partner</li></ul>				
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V. Papava characterizes this generation in terms of changes in some family's traditional functions. In Soviet times, against the will of the family, the state took over the responsibility to satisfy all its needs. There was an undesirable transformation of the family from being independent of the state to dependent on the state. Due to the limitation of economic independence, the family lost the ability to increase income, and the state entered its household. Ignorance of the independence of the family violated the "partnership relations" between the state and family, so that the family did not fully fulfill its traditional functions and the state failed to fulfill its obligations. The result was a conflict between the family and state, which was reflected in the destabilization of some family functions<sup>8</sup>.

According to the research of Sh. Schwartz, people from the Silent Generation are not open to changes, do not need to develop professionally, they only need a peaceful life in line with religious beliefs<sup>9</sup>. Surveys conducted by the Levada Center and the Pew Research Center in 2017 and 2018 in the post-Soviet space showed that former Soviet citizens still feel apathy, disappointment, uncertainty about their identity and a combination of longing for communist times on the one hand and the need to protect religious values on the other<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, by disrupting the "partnership relations" between the state and family, this generation continues to build its relations with state institutions on suspicion and distrust, while pessimism about the future continues

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<sup>8</sup> Papava (2005).

<sup>9</sup> Schwartz (2012).

<sup>10</sup> Levada Center 2017; Pew Research Center 2017. Public opinion survey: Residents of Georgia, URL = [http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-29\\_georgia\\_poll\\_presentation.pdf](http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf).

to affect the daily behavior of this generation<sup>11</sup>. In the context of special values at the social and cultural levels, the *homo sovieticus* generation considers kinship as very important bonds—bonds to family and friends are considered a priority, especially in the hierarchy of values, they are placed before obligations towards the state and the entire society<sup>12</sup>.

The Georgian systemic transformation has had a multi-dimensional impact on society. The changes in the political, economic, and social life primarily influenced the family structure, which was previously dependent on the state, and the roles of gender in the family and society. According to V. Papava, the generation born in the years 1970–1990 is referred to as *homo transformaticus*—which means people who are not able to completely get rid of the fear of the state and thus slowly begin to pursue their own private interests and benefit from it. The attempt to transfer Western individualism to the place on which *homo sovieticus* was formed, and to replace the identity of this generation with individualism in the context of *homo transformaticus* ended in failure, or rather in the creation of a hybrid between the Soviet man and the *oeconomicus* man<sup>13</sup>.

The economic reforms that followed 1991 were shaped on a ground unprepared for these changes, and their consequences were unfair privatization, corruption, the expansion of the shadow economy and hyperinflation. These negative results of the reforms also influenced the direction of some *homo transformaticus*. On the one hand, people of this generation focused on social justice (the example of the Rose Revolution), ensuring material security for every member

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<sup>11</sup> Merheim-Eyre (2018).

<sup>12</sup> Sumbadze, Tarkhan-Mouravi (2003).

<sup>13</sup> Papava (2005).

of society, in opposition to the free market economy. On the other hand, some headed towards *homo deformaticus*, interpreting the free market economy as being particularly oriented towards the needs of an individual at the expense of society and the economic development of the state. Similarly to the concept of *homo adapticus* by Y.A. Levada, a person from the *homo transformaticus* generation can be described as one who gradually gets used to the principles of the market economy and democratization, interpreting these principles through the prism of the values professed by *homo sovieticus*<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, the analogically terms “Baby Boomers” and “Generation X” coincide with the author’s assumption. According to B. Hysa, the Baby Boomers generation grew up in the period of socio-political transformations and economic development based on the free market economy, which were a barrier for this generation<sup>15</sup>. However, this generation is already referred to as the transition generation, the generation of individualists, people who value independent work, with a recognition of authorities and the need for support in making any changes, inherited from the previous generation. In the literature on the subject, the Generation X is referred to as Stability Seekers.

In the context of social and cultural changes, the transformation of the family and its functions took place through the transformation of individual factors: religious, psychological, and traditional ones. *Homo transformaticus*, like *homo sovieticus*, prioritizes ties with family and friends<sup>16</sup>. The *homo transformaticus* generation, however, are people who value commitment also at the level of public life.

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<sup>14</sup> Levada (1999).

<sup>15</sup> Hysa (2016).

<sup>16</sup> Sumbadze, Tarkhan-Mouravi (2003).



Representatives of this generation started the second transformation, that is, the Rose Revolution—they held protests in Tbilisi. M. Saakashvili, a leader of the protests, later the president, was 35 years old during the dissents (generation of Baby Boomers, *homo transformativus*). Moreover, the Revolution was a combination of many different political and independent forces, one of which was the Kmara [Eng. “Enough”] youth group, significant to some extent in mobilizing the population. Thus, an important difference between the Soviet generation and the *homo transformativus* generation is political activity. The Rose Revolution promoted the creation of a “new man,” and in Georgia this man obeys the law, is incorruptible, i.e., the antithesis of *homo sovieticus*. According to revolutionaries, only radical capitalism was a means that could deconstruct *homo sovieticus* into modern *homo oeconomicus*.

Among the *homo sovieticus* and *homo transformativus* one can also distinguish the Jeans Generation. It was a small transitional subculture of people born in 1945–1955, from middle-class or upper-class families, united under the influence of Western culture and music. They were characterized by a love of the American way of life, music and art, and a rebellious attitude towards the USSR. Few representatives of this subculture went down in history, because in 1983 a group of seven young people tried to hijack a plane (Aeroflot Flight 6833) from Tbilisi in order to escape to the “West.” The pilot of the plane resisted the hijacking and eventually returned the plane to Tbilisi. After the Soviet special forces stormed the plane to the ground, the four remaining members of the group were arrested and finally tried (three hijackers, three crew members and two passengers died in a fire on board). This generation of late socialism became

symbolically associated with freedom, music, art, and Western style of clothing (jeans fashionable at the time) only ten years after the fall of the Iron Curtain<sup>17</sup>.

#### 4. Transformation from *Homo Transformativus* to *Homo Oeconomicus*

The democratization currently taking place in Georgia has affected not only political but also social structures. The transformation of a generation from *homo transformativus* to *homo oeconomicus* is a gulf in the context of attitudes towards the political, economic, and social spheres. *Homo oeconomicus* in general terminology functions as Generation Y, which grew up in the age of computerization and the development of the Internet. According to B. Hysa, they are people open to the world without socio-political limitations, with the possibility of career development and economic emigration. People from this generation need independence, but they are looking for their mentors. They invest in themselves, showing reluctance to make long-term commitments<sup>18</sup>. And the generation born in 2000 is Generation Z, that is, the Connected Generation—connected to the network, the Internet<sup>19</sup>. They cannot function without new media as it is part of their everyday life. They are mobile people, open to other cultures, and open to changes. In my opinion, Generation Z, or Paradoxical Generation in Georgia, is an internally conflicted generation, placed between tradition (the values of previous generations) and modernization (values flowing from the “West”). In Western societies, attachment to tradition is not

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<sup>17</sup> Gozalishvili (2018).

<sup>18</sup> Hysa (2016).

<sup>19</sup> Turner (2015).

such a key element as it is in Georgia. Older generations and the *homo oeconomicus* generation itself, despite different values, share those associated with traditions in the context of family structure and attachment to the national culture. However, the external values related to democratization, free market economy and, above all, the Western lifestyle focused on egocentrism and personal development put the youngest generation at a crossroads in choosing a path of life. When analyzing this generation, it is worth paying attention to the concept of the paradoxical man. According to this concept, a transitional society produces such a unique and surprising phenomenon as individuals who focus on mutually exclusive values while seeking to achieve conflicting goals at the same time. In the minds and behavior of the same individual, opposite, and sometimes simply mutually exclusive judgments, attitudes, orientations and intentions coexist, which creates an image of paradoxical behavior<sup>20</sup>.

In the consciousness of the paradoxical generation, under the influence of external and internal factors, cardinal changes occur, the result of which is the paradoxicality of thinking and cognition, and evaluation of phenomena and processes surrounding a representative of the generation. It is characterized by the existence of a specific type of contradiction that increases as a result of changes in economic and political relations, the breakdown of the image and lifestyle, the violation of stereotypes and national mentality<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> Toshchenko (2008).

<sup>21</sup> Toshchenko (2006).

## 5. Summary and Conclusions

According to M. Mnatsakanyan, this paradoxical character of people's consciousness and behavior rapidly increases in times of crises and deformation of social bonds, i.e., in the conditions of creating and deepening the "atomic" state of society<sup>22</sup>. There is an internal connection between the paradoxicality of consciousness and the behavior of people with various forms of deviation. In fact, we are faced with a specific class of public life phenomena which, in the most general form, can be characterized as "incompatibility."


According to T. Khoshtaria's research based on Schwarz's theory regarding basic values of generations with the 2014 World Values Survey data, the older and younger generations do not differ much. Quantitative data analysis suggests that the values, in accordance with Schwarz's theory, such as "security" (which includes the core values of "conformity," and "tradition") and "self-direction" (which includes the basic values of "benevolence" and "universalism") are very important for people of all ages in Georgia. Over 70% in all age groups rated the people described in verbal portraits representing these five basic values as "very similar to them" or "like them" (Figure 1). On the other hand, there are some values that have been assessed completely differently by people in different age groups. Within the values of "self-direction," "stimulation," and "hedonism" (representing a higher ordered value of "openness to change"), there are differences depending on the age group. Compared to older generations, a greater percentage of young people identify with someone for whom it is important to come up with new ideas,

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<sup>22</sup> Mnatsakanyan (2006).

take risks and have a good time. Likewise, the core values of “achievement” and “power” (representing a higher value of “self-improvement”) were assessed differently by young people and the elderly. While success is important to 66% of young people, this percentage is lower among older people (Figure 2)<sup>23</sup>.


Figure 1. Question: “I will briefly describe a person. Could you please tell me whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, a little like you, a little like you, not like you, or not at all like you?” [by age, in 2014]



Source: Social Science in the Caucasus, CRRC, <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2018/01/>

<sup>23</sup> Khoshtaria (2018).

Figure 2. Question: "I will briefly describe a person. Could you please tell me whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, a little like you, not like you, or not at all like you?" [by age, in 2014]



Source: Social Science in the Caucasus, CRRC, <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2018/01/>

In a nutshell, the transformation in 1991 changed both the political system and society itself. The theoretical division into generations has also become a reality, where the division into older and younger generations is visible, within which we can distinguish the *homo sovieticus*, *homo transformativus*, *homo oeconomicus*, and the paradoxical generation. Each of these generations creates its own values and has its own political awareness, but with common elements that bind all generations—such values are family, religion, and traditions. They differ mainly in their approach to government, openness to the world and the resulting globalization and westernization. However, the youngest generation is specific and peculiar, as the name used by me indicates, stuck between the clashes of tradition and modernization.

Observation of the generations, the changing trends in the values of the young generation, the influence of the older generation on the younger, inconstant generational dialogue, and above all, the new socio-political reality related to democratization and the search for new variants and forms of democracy and economic development will push young people to specific actions in the future. The questions remain, what values related to the political and national tradition of Georgians will remain passed on by this generation, which will constitute the new political elite? Will they become a hybrid between the new and the old? Will the next transformation take place, observing changes in public sentiment and the visible polarization of opinions about the transformation itself and the current governments? An attempt to answer these questions will contribute to further research on the place of young people in the socio-political space.

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